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Inequality has become the issue of the day.   It is not just the large numbers in 
poverty; it is the evisceration of the middle, the increasing proportion of income 
that goes to the top.  One startling statistic succeeds another:  8 men have as 
much wealth as the bottom 3.5 billion in the world.3  That there will be social, 
political, and economic consequences goes without saying.4   
 
This is a marked change from the world 50 years ago, when one of the challenges 
put to the economics profession was explaining the constancy of the distribution 
of income.  (Kaldor 1957.)   The more historical analysis of Kuznets suggested that 
                                                          
1 I wish to dedicate this lecture in memory of my good friend and co-author, Anthony B. Atkinson, who worked 
tirelessly throughout his life to understand better the sources of inequality and what can be done about it.  His 
enormous contributions have left an indelible mark on the profession.   
2  University Professor, Columbia University. Paper prepared for presentation at the 18th World Congress of the 
International Economic Association, Mexico City, June 19-23 2017.  This is a continuation of a long-term research 
program.  Earlier results were reported in a paper originally presented at an IEA/World Bank Roundtable on Shared 
Prosperity, Jordan, June 10-11, 2014 (Stiglitz, 2016a), at an INET seminar at Columbia University, December 3, 
2014, and in a NBER Working Paper (Stiglitz, 2015b).  This paper in particular incorporates and extends the results 
reported there.  I am indebted to Ignacio Gonzales, Martin Guzman, Arjun Jayadev, Suresh Naidu, Stefano 
Battiston, and Mauro Gallegati for conversations on various issues discussed here.  Over the years, I have also 
benefited from conversations with Adair Turner and Shahe Emran.   My earlier work in this area was greatly 
influenced by Tony Atkinson, David Bevan, John Flemming, Robert Solow, James Meade, Frank Hahn, Nicholas 
Kaldor, Jim Mirrlees, Benoit Mandelbrot, and David Champernowne.  Financial support was provided by INET (the 
Institute for New Economic Thinking) and the Ford Foundation Inequality Project at Roosevelt Institute, supported 
by the Ford and MacArthur Foundations, and the Bernard and Irene Schwartz Foundation.  I am indebted to 
Matthieu Teachout for research assistance and Debarati Ghosh for editorial assistance.     
3 Oxfam (2017).  
4 The standard models in macro-economics, employing the concept of a representative agent, begin with the 
assumption that distribution does not matter.  The conditions under which that is true are, of course, extra-
ordinarily restrictive.  The model, nonetheless, has had enormous influence.  Some of the failures of that model—
which have had enormous consequences—can be associated with that assumption.  See my Presidential Address 
to the International Economic Association, 2014 (Stiglitz, 2016b).    
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in earlier stages of development, there would be an increase in inequality, 
followed by a decrease (Kuznets curve5).  Those prevailing doctrines were upset 
by what happened after 1980, as inequality in virtually every dimension increased 
in the US and many other countries.   
 
In thinking about a complex phenomenon like income distribution, one needs a 
benchmark model, providing a clear analysis of the dynamics of inequality under 
certain ideal conditions.  Large deviations between what is observed and the 
predictions of that model provide insights into critical differences between the 
idealized model and the real world. 
 
In analyzing the market economy, the Arrow-Debreu model—the mathematical 
representation of the competitive economy—has provided the benchmark.  
Deviations from the “ideal” are referred to as market failures and help explain 
why the economy doesn’t attain efficiency (in contrast to the ideal model, where 
the economy is always Pareto efficient.)  The theory of the second best6 serves as 
a reminder, though, that “reforms” seemingly bringing the economy closer to the 
theoretical ideal may actually lower well-being.7 
 
Some years ago, I provided such a theoretical model for examining the dynamics 
of the distribution of income and wealth among individuals, with later work (some 
with David Bevan of Oxford) extending Champernowne’s earlier work (1953) and 
                                                          
5 Kuznets (1955). 
6 Lipsey and Lancaster (1956). 
7 For instance, in a world with incomplete risk markets, eliminating trade barriers may actually lead to a Pareto 
inferior outcome.  See Newbery and Stiglitz (1984). 
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incorporating essential stochastic drivers of distribution.8  In some ways, the 
model has held up well—explaining, for instance the Pareto tail of the wealth 
distribution and why changes in the economy and policy might be expected to 
lead to a fattening of the tail.  In the first part of this lecture, I review and extend 
that framework, providing some insights into the increasing inequality being 
experienced today. 
 
But the levels of inequality being observed are greater, and often take on a 
different form, than these developments of the benchmark model can explain.  In 
the second part of the lecture, I propose some fundamental departures.  The 
earlier model was based on a competitive framework.  Many aspects of inequality 
could never be explained within that framework.  Increasing departures from the 
framework are an essential part of an explanation of today’s increasing inequality, 
and insights into why these forms/sources of inequality may be particularly 
pernicious for societal well-being.   
 
Alternative interpretations of the increase in inequality 
 
There are two alternative interpretations of the increase in equality of wealth 
observed in recent years:  (a) that a natural feature of capitalism is an ever 
increasing inequality—until all the wealth is in the hands of a few; or (b) that 
there is an equilibrium wealth distribution, and certain changes have occurred in 
                                                          
8 See Stiglitz (1966, 1969), Bevan (1974, 1979), and Bevan and Stiglitz (1978).  Becker (1986, 1994) and Becker and 
Tomes (1979) have provided a similar, less formalized dynamic model, but with greater articulation of certain 
aspects concerning human capital and demography—some predictions of which have subsequently been 
questioned.   
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the last third of a century to move us from one equilibrium to another.  This paper 
takes the latter view.   Our models identify, however, circumstances in which 
there may not be an equilibrium wealth distribution—where in fact there may be 
ever-increasing inequality.  We believe, however, the evidence is that these 
conditions are not satisfied.   
 
 
I.  The basic model 
The basic model (Stiglitz, 1966, 1969) embraces dynastic families saving over their 
lifetime, and dividing their wealth among their heirs.  Per capita dynastic 
accumulation occurs when the pace of lifetime accumulation exceeded the 
equalizing effect of division among one’s heirs.  Alternative inheritance rules (e.g. 
primogeniture) allow for the greater possibility of wealth in the hands of a few.    
 
Thus, in the basic framework, there are opposing centrifugal and centripetal 
forces, pulling the economy apart and pushing it together.  In equilibrium, the two 
are just balanced.   The major centrifugal force in the core model is “noise,” the 
randomness in returns to capital or the number of children.  A family that was 
lucky and had higher than normal returns for several generations would obviously 
have more wealth per capita.  Even if each family got an independent draw in its 
returns each year, there is the possibility of a run of luck, and therefore of wealth 
inequality.  This is even more so if there is serial correlation, or if those with 
wealth have access to inside information, which allows them to get a higher 




But only a fraction, s, of this lifetime income is passed onto one’s children (s can 
be thought of as rule-based, or the result of a complex intergenerational welfare 
maximization problem9), and then that amount has to be divided among the 
heirs, and so long as  
(1)  sr < n 
(where r is the lifetime return on capital and n is the rate of reproduction), there 
is a strong centripetal force.   
 
(If the economy is growing, as a result of labor augmenting technological change 
at the rate λ, then what matters is the accumulation of wealth relative to the size 
of the economy, i.e. so long as  
(1a)  sr < n + λ =g 
(where g is the rate of growth of the economy and λ is the rate of labor 
augmenting technological change), relative dynastic wealth per capita is falling.  In 
the long run equilibrium, the rate of growth, g, is just the sum of the rate of 
growth of the population and the rate of labor augmenting technological change.  
Thus, there is a centripetal force in effect so long as is r < g/s.  Note that Piketty 
(2014) assumed precisely the opposite inequality.   As Stiglitz (1969) showed, in 
the short run, r may exceed g (or g/s), during early stages of development, in 
which case inequality will grow; but eventually r < g/s.)10    
                                                          
9 The distinction is important, because if s is endogenous, it may well be affected by changes in policy or in the 
macro-state of the economy. 
10 Piketty’s hypothesis that r > g is based on historical data of the last 50 years.  As we noted, for the share of 
capitalists to increase, sr > g, which is a much more stringent condition.  Even at the very top, it appears that s is 
one third or less (on average).  The central point of this paper, concerns the extrapolation into the future:  it is hard 
to construct a coherent model in which r does not eventually decline.  (Note that the return on safe assets is less 
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A key feature of the Stiglitz 1966 and 1969 models is macro-micro consistency, 
that is that the aggregate wealth be the sum of the family wealth,  
                 (2)  𝐾𝐾 = ∑𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 
where 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 is the ith family’s total capital stock, 𝐾𝐾 is the aggregate capital stock of 
the economy, and that the return to capital reflect the scarcity of capital, e.g. that 
there is an aggregate production function of the form  
                     Q = F(K, aL) 
where a is the productivity of a worker, K is the aggregate capital stock and L the 
labor supply.  F has constant returns to scale, so in the usual notation, the return 
to capital in competitive equilibrium is f’(k), where Q/L = F(K, aL)/L = F(K/aL, 1) = 
f(k), where k = K/aL, the effective capital labor ratio.   λ = d ln (a)/dt.  For 
simplicity, we focus in this paper on the case where λ = 0, in which case g = n in 
the long run.   
 
The key variable in equation (1), the rate of return, r, is endogenous11, and needs 
to be “solved for” both at any moment of time and over the long run. In the 
discussion below, we will formulate various models of the economy, and they will 
generate different long run equilibrium conditions.  In the straightforward 
(dynastic extension of the) standard Solow growth model, condition (1) is 




                                                          
than the growth rate, but what matters for the analysis here of inequality is the average return on capital, which 
includes a risk premium.) 




In the straightforward extension of the dynastic Solow model, with everyone 
having the same wages, it is easy to see that in the long run there is a strong force 
for wealth convergence in the absence of uncertainty.  There is no centrifugal 
force, only a centripetal one.   




(log 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖) = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖/𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 − 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 R , 
where  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 is the ith family’s income (per capita) 
(4)  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖, 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is the ith family’s wage, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 is its net return on capital12, and 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 is its 
capital (per capita).     𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 is the ith family's rate of reproduction.  It follows that if all 
families have the same savings rate, wages and return to capital, the same 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 and 
the same 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 
 
(5)  d ln ki/dt – dln kj/dt = sw(1/ki – 1/kj) 
 
There is always convergence of wealth to equality:  The family with the higher 
capital has its wealth growing more slowly.   
 
If children’s wages are the same as their parents, and there is a wage distribution, 
the capital takes on the same distribution as wages.   
                                                          
12 i.e. net of depreciation.  For simplicity, we shall assume that there is no depreciation. 
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This is obviously an oversimplified model, yielding results which do not explain 
one of the key features of the wealth distribution, the Pareto tail, unless the 
income distribution itself has a Pareto tail.  Later, we will discuss models of wage 
distributions, but the standard analysis suggests that the distribution looks more 
like a lognormal (Aitchison and Brown, 1976). 
 
 
Balancing Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces 
An equilibrium wealth distribution can easily be generated by introducing 
uncertainty in the model.  Formally, there are two approaches, one using Markov 
models, the other using diffusion models.   
 
Champernowne (1953) explored the mathematics of Markov models as they 
applied to the analysis of income distributions, and Stiglitz (1966) showed that a 
natural stochastic variation of his dynastic model satisfied the Champernowne 
conditions, the restrictions on the Markov matrix which gave rise to a Pareto 
tail.13  The Markov model simply relates the probability that a child of a parent 
who is in, say, the .01 percentile, winds up in each of the 1000 different 
(hundredths of) percentiles.     
 
                                                          
13 The three central conditions are that for large k the distribution of the percentage increase in wealth per capita 
be independent of k with a negative expected value, and that the lowest state not be an absorbing state.  For large 
enough k, E Δln ki = sr – n < 0, and for small ki , Δln ki  ≈ w/ki  + (sr – n) > 0 always, so long as r increases to infinity as 
k goes to zero.  In the subsequent years, Pareto results have frequently emerged in models with heterogeneous 
agents.  For a recent treatment, see Nirei and Aoki, 2014. 
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It is easier to see what is going on, however, in diffusion process.14  If we 
approximate the accumulation process by a diffusion process, assume that wages 
are the same for everyone, and say assume that uncertainty in the return to 
capital is the only source of uncertainty, we write the dynastic differential 
equation as15 
(6)  𝑑𝑑𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑 = (𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤 − 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  
where the risk is associated with the return on capital and is proportional to 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟:   
(7)                                                                    𝜎𝜎 = 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝜎𝜎� 
and where μ is the drift in the stochastic process 
(8)                                                       𝜇𝜇 = 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟. 
Macro- and micro-consistency requires, as we have noted, that aggregate 𝑘𝑘 (the 
aggregate capital labor ratio) determine the average return on capital, 𝑟𝑟, and 
wages.  We extend the standard neoclassical analysis by assuming the possibility 
of randomness in the returns to capital and labor:   
(9)  𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓′(𝑘𝑘) 
(10)  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑓𝑓(𝑘𝑘) − 𝑓𝑓′(𝑘𝑘)𝑘𝑘), 
where 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 is the relative return to the ith family’s investment (some families are 
able to obtain a higher return from their investments than others, with 𝑓𝑓’(𝑘𝑘) 
being the average marginal return across all families)16 and where 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is the 
                                                          
14 Early analyses of income distribution using diffusion models include Stiglitz (1978) and Bevan (1979) and Bevan 
and Stiglitz (1979). 
15 Z is a standard Brownian motion, i.e.  dZt ≡  limΔt→0 εt √Δt, where εt here is normally distributed with mean zero 
and unit variance.    
16 That is, in the obvious notation, 𝐸𝐸(𝜌𝜌)  = 1, 𝐸𝐸(𝜈𝜈)  = 1. 
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relative return to the ith family’s labor (some families receive higher wages—
payments per unit labor—than others, with 𝑓𝑓(𝑘𝑘) − 𝑓𝑓′(𝑘𝑘)𝑘𝑘 being the average 
wage across all families). 
As we have already noted, the macro-dynamics of this model imply that in the 
long run equilibrium,  𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓(𝑘𝑘 ∗) = 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘∗ , or  r = f’ < f/k = n/s. This generates the 
essential condition for there to be a long run equilibrium wealth distribution, 
equation (1), or 𝜇𝜇 > 0.  All that is required for there being an equilibrium wealth 
distribution is that there is an active centripetal force, i.e. something pulling the 
distribution together, and some noise in the wealth accumulation process.  
Without the former, the rich get richer--there is no equilibrium; without the latter 
there is (in this model) no wealth inequality.  
But note that in the early stages of development, when the capital labor ratio is 
low, r is large, and hence there is no centripetal force.  This may be part of the 
explanation of Kuznets curve.17  Over time, the aggregate capital labor ratio 
grows, r falls, and eventually, sr < n.   
When (1) is satisfied, the stationary wealth distribution has a Pareto tail with tail 
inequality  𝜂𝜂 given by                        








                                                          
17 The other intuitive explanation is that some individuals and some parts of a country learn how to learn—how to 
get more productive—before others.  They take off.  As they do, the gap between them and those in the rural 









  = 2( n – sr) / 𝜎𝜎2                                                                                                                              
Thus we get the intuitive result that the greater the centrifugal force, the degree 
of uncertainty, the greater the equilibrium inequality; the greater the savings rate 
or the return to capital, the more there is intergenerational transmission of 
advantage, the more inequality, and the greater is n (the more wealth gets 
divided) the less inequality.   
 
 
r is endogenous 
 
This analysis, however, is unsatisfactory because in the long run, r is endogenous.  
We need to relate inequality to the exogenous variables.  Substituting the long 
run equilibrium condition into (12), we obtain 
                      (13)                                𝐷𝐷∗ = 2 1−𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘
𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘
2𝑛𝑛𝜎𝜎�2
   
In long run equilibrium, the tail-inequality does not depend at all on the size of 
the difference between the rate of return and the rate of growth, but simply 
increases with the rate of growth, with the share of capital, Sk, and with the 
variance of the return to capital.  Some of these results (e.g. that of an increase in 
the rate of growth) may seem surprising, but they arise because an increase in n, 
for any given s, results in a decrease in k and an increase in r, and the variance of r 




Sk is, of course, endogenous, except in the case where there is a unitary elasticity 
of substitution.  If the aggregate savings rate should fall, keeping n fixed, since s/n 
= k/f, f/k will rise, i.e. the output capital ratio will rise and k will fall, and if the 
elasticity of substitution is less than unity, the share of capital will increase, and D 
will unambiguously fall.18  There is evidence of an increase in the share of capital 
in recent years as well as some evidence of an increase in the variance of 
returns.19   
 
The above analysis assumed that everyone got the same return to capital.  But 
assume that those at the top have a higher return than the average return, say by 
a factor ξ.  Then D* becomes 
 




And the tail is fatter—there is more inequality.  This will be the case if those at the 
top have inside information, access to investments that others don’t have, or 
choose different portfolios (see below) or if they are taxed at a lower rate. Again, 
there is evidence for each of these.  Figure 1b shows, for instance, the marked 
differences in ownership of different types of assets.  When an asset is “stripped” 
into two components, equity and debt, the rich tend to buy the first, the riskier, 
                                                          
18 A decrease in n has exactly the opposite effect.  The drift depends on sr = nkf’/f = nSk, so that if the elasticity of 
substitution is less than unity, an increase in s reduces the drift and increases the variance, leading to more 
inequality.  But (13) says that even if the elasticity of substitution is greater than unity, this may be true (but is not 
necessarily so.) 
19 Similarly, s and n can be viewed as endogenous. s can be viewed as generated by an intertemporal maximization 
problem, where the key determinants of s are the shape of the utility function and the intertemporal rate of 
discount.  Mattauch et al 2017 for instance provide a simple model in which s is endogenized.   
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while the poor, the second.  The former has a higher return and a higher variance 
of return.     















Capital taxes in the basic model 
If we introduce capital taxes with the proceeds returned to individuals as a 
uniform lump sum transfer, the after tax return is lowered to r *(1-t), where r* is 
the before tax return on capital, which may be a function of the tax rate.  In the 
Solow model, the savings rate does not depend on distribution (or on anything), 
with the result that r* is unchanged, so that a capital tax reduces the equilibrium 
degree of inequality.  It increases drift—the centripetal force of n is increased 
relative to the centrifugal force of capital accumulation—as it reduces the 




I.A.  A special case:  Kaldorian Savings 
We noted that both the centrifugal and centripetal forces are determined as part 
of the long run equilibrium in the economy.  The previous section analyzed these 
using a generalization of the Solow growth model.  An alternative model, 
currently out of fashion, is that of Kaldor, who assumed that a fraction sp of 
profits is saved and a smaller fraction, sw of wages.  Thus the wealth of capitalists, 
Kp grows at the rate of spr, and if their per capita wealth converges, it implies that 
in long run equilibrium 
(15) sp r = n 
(where it will be recalled, given our simplifying assumption that λ= 0, n = g).   This 
means that if r is non-stochastic, whatever the initial wealth distribution among 
capitalists, it gets passed on.   Unlike the Solow model, there is no tendency for 
wealth convergence even among the capitalists.  Even more disturbing, if r is 
stochastic, there is no centripetal force.  This means that wealth inequality—as 
measured by the tail of the distribution—is ever-growing.  But note, the share of 
income held by capitalists converges, since (15) defines k*, the equilibrium capital 
labor ratio, and kw, the per capita wealth of workers, in the long run is given by  
(16)    kw =  sw w/(n – swr). 
which also converges.20  The share of wealth held by workers increases with sw.   
 
 
                                                          
20 If sw is too high, workers’ savings, on their own, drive the interest rate below n/sp, in which case, in the long run, 
there are no capitalists.  All capital is held by workers.  See Pasinetti (1962), Samuelson and Modigliani (1966), 




In this model, moreover, a tax on capital leaves unchanged the after tax return on 
capital, and therefore has no effect either on the centrifugal or centripetal force 
on the distribution of wealth in the economy.  But workers are actually worse off, 
at least for small taxes, even when all the proceeds are redistributed back to 
workers, because their wages fall by more than the transfers.21  Still, their share 
of wealth and income increases. 
This highlights the possibility that a tax on capital does not translate into workers 
who are better off—the effects on savings from a capital tax can be so adverse 
that workers are worse off.   
But this is a somewhat artificial result, for it ignores the possibility that the 
government can invest in capital.  Assume that government invests a fraction of 
the revenue it receives (equal to sp) in capital, and that in the production 
function, public and private capital are additive, then there is no change in the 
capital labor ratio, the wage rate, and the before tax return to capital.  For 
capitalists, however, capital per capita will start to decline.   
          dKg/dt = spr[Kg + τ Kp] 
and 
          dKp/dt= spr(1- τ)Kp  < nKp 
so  
                                                          
21 From (15), f’(1 – τ) = n/sp , so f”(1-τ) dk = f’ d τ .  Let y = w + τrk.  Then dy/dτ = (dy/dk)(dk/dτ) + rk  
 dw/dτ = (dw/dk) (dk/d τ) = (- kf”) f’/f”(1-τ) = -kf’/(1- τ).  We can thus show that  
  
d y/dτ = = 0 at τ = 0   
 
d2  [τ rk + w]/dτ2 = -f’k /(1 − 𝜏𝜏)2 < 0 at τ = 0 
17 
 
         dK/dt = spr (Kg + Kp) = sprK, 
          dln k/dt = 0 
          dlnkp/dt< 0. 
Aggregate K increases at the same rate as before, so that eventually, public 
capital totally replaces private capital.  Meanwhile, (1 – sp) [τ rKp + rKg] can be 
distributed as consumption to workers.  They are unambiguously better off.  
Obviously, as the share of capitalists disappears, the share of labor increases. 
(The variance of wealth holdings continues to increase, because there is no 
centripetal force for capital even owned by workers.) 
 
I.B.  Life Cycle Savings 
There are some family dynasties with so much capital that their wage income can 
be ignored, and some families with so little income that they aren’t thinking of 
leaving anything to their heirs.  It is thus natural to simplify the analysis to a two 
class model, one with life cycle savers, one focusing on dynastic well-being.  To 
simplify further, we focus on steady states, in which life cycle savings is simply 
s(r)w22.  The dynastic savers save at the rate sp (which may or may not be based 
on maximizing some intertemporal family utility function).23  Their equilibrium 
condition is just as described in equation (15).    Workers’ capital in equilibrium is 
a function of their wages and the interest rate: 
(17) kw = S(w, r) = S(w(k*), r(k*)). 
where k* is the solution to (15).  For a two-class equilibrium to exist, 
                                                          
22 Obviously, this is a special case of the more general savings function s(w,r) which arises in the case of 
homothetic preferences. 
23 The “two class” model can be shown to be a limiting case of a one-class model with highly non-linear savings 
functions.  See Stiglitz (2015b). 
18 
 
(18) k* > kw*.That is, if we simplify S(w,r) = ws(r), 
(19)  k* > s(r*)w 
Or 
(20) s < k /w = (rk/w)(1/r) =  (Sk/(1 – Sk))( sp/n) 
  
Using (15).  For plausible values of the parameters, (20) may not be satisfied, in 
which case workers’ are saving so much that the interest rate falls so low that 
capitalists decide to consume so much as to leave nothing to their children24.        
In this model, which can be viewed as the life-cycle variant of the Pasinetti (1962) 
model, there are two regimes.  In the two class regimes, where the capitalists 
persist, there is no centripetal force for capital, so capitalists’ wealth gets 
increasingly dispersed, even though its average value is constant.  The one class 
regime is identical to the Solow model.   
 
Policies which reduce the return on capital of capitalists and increase the savings 
of workers can help move the economy towards a one-class model.   
        
I.C    Heterogeneous Labor 
Assume now wages are not the same for all workers, and wages for each family 
are determined by the same stochastic process, with regression towards the 
mean, that families optimize intergenerational utility and that there is a lower 
                                                          
24 Mattauch et al 2017 show that under quite general conditions if a tax on capital is imposed, there is a high 
enough tax such that k/w is always less than s.   
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bound on wealth (individuals can’t borrow more than a certain amount). (The 
latter assumption turns out to play an important role in the determination of 
wealth and consumption inequalities.)   The mathematics is the same as equation 
(6) above 
(17)        𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑 = −𝛽𝛽(𝐴𝐴 − ?̅?𝐴)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑 
 where A is some measure of ability and where 𝛽𝛽 is the extent of regression 
towards the mean ( , 𝛽𝛽 =  0 means that there is no regression towards the 
mean).  Individuals with above average ability on average have less able 
descendants (regression towards the mean).  We can solve for the equilibrium 
distribution of A.  The faster the regression towards the mean and the less the 
“noise” (𝜎𝜎 ), the lower the level of inequality.   
A is unobservable.  What is observable is wages, or income, which are some 
function of A, say w = ln A.  Simple models of ability distribution give rise to 
normally distributed abilities, and if w = ln A, lognormal distributions of wages 
(incomes), often said to describe the wage distribution apart from the top 
(Aitchison and Brown (1966)).  But there is no reason that the transformation of 
“ability” into “productivity” doesn’t occur through a different process, giving rise 
to, say, a fatter distribution of wages, e.g. the Champernowne (1953) 
distribution.25 
Clearly, education and social systems that are associated with assortive mating 
(e.g. more social segregation) lead to a lower value of 𝛽𝛽  and thus more 
                                                          







 where 𝐹𝐹(𝑦𝑦) is the 
proportion of individuals whose earnings are less than 𝑦𝑦, 𝑢𝑢 is the median, and 𝜂𝜂 is a constant, related to the 
coefficient of the Pareto tail.  
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inequality.  More local control of education may mean more randomness in the 
quality of education, and thus greater variance.  More economic geographic 
segregation (as has been happening) with a local education system is likely to 
lower 𝛽𝛽  (Bischoff and Reardon, 2011).  On the other hand, a growth of pre-school 
education increases 𝛽𝛽.  Overall, policy changes over recent decades plausibly have 
led to an increase in wage inequality. 
ID. Wage and wealth inequality 
The natural model for analyzing equilibrium wealth distributions combines the 
underlying wage generation process based on regression towards the mean with 
a capital accumulation process as above built on top.  High ability/wage 
individuals save a lot because they rationally expect their children to face lower 
wages.26  Wealth inequality in the tails depends then on the dispersion of the 
returns to capital and the wage generating mechanism.  Bevan (1974, 1979) and 
Bevan and Stiglitz (1978) have attempted to do so, with some striking results. 
In the absence of correlation of the return on wealth with wealth, Bevan (1979) 
suggests that to get a sufficiently fat tail to the wealth distribution one has to use 
a fat tailed wage distribution, such as the Champernowne distribution rather than 
the lognormal.  Alternatively, within the model itself, there are equally or more 
plausible changes to the model (some of which are discussed below)—a 
correlation of wealth with the average return to wealth or its variance.  If richer 
individuals have higher or more uncertain returns, the tails of the distribution will 
be fatter.    
                                                          
26 This is a natural extension of Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis to an intergenerational context.  
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We should not, I believe, confine ourselves solely to examining inequalities in the 
tail.  We can solve for the variance of wealth ownership as a simple measure of 
wealth inequality for the overall distribution.  If 𝑛𝑛 and 𝑟𝑟 are small, then 





where  𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘 R  and 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤   are the variances in 𝑘𝑘 and 𝑤𝑤, respectively.27  Wealth inequality 
increases with the difference between 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟 and 𝑛𝑛.   But, as we emphasized above, 𝑟𝑟 
is an endogenous variable, and one should relate the degree of inequality to the 
exogenous parameters of the model, as we did above.  Moreover, in the more 
general models analyzed by Bevan (1974, 1979) and Bevan and Stiglitz (1979) 𝑠𝑠 
itself is an endogenous variable, affected by the underlying parameters.  Thus, a 
lower level of 𝛽𝛽 might lead to a higher savings rate, since parents with high wages 
know that their children are not going to do as well; this goes in the opposite 
direction of the direct effect of a decrease in 𝛽𝛽, which is to lower the variance of 
wages and, at a fixed value of 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤, to lower 𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘. 
 
In our economy, r is sufficiently small that families would have little incentive to 
save if they knew that their children were going to be as well off as they.  For 
instance, assume a dynastic family maximizing intertemporal family utility, with 
future families’ utility discounted at a factor δ.  If they treat their descendants 
with the same weight as they treat themselves and they knew their children were 
going to have a wage the same as theirs, they would take any wealth and spread 
it among all future generations.  In the limiting case where they had strong 
                                                          
27 Note that in this model, 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤 is itself an endogenous variable, depending on the pace of regression towards the 
mean for ability.)   
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egalitarian feelings, they would spread it so that their children are in the same 
position as they are, i.e. if r = n, they would save all of their wealth, so that all of 
their children would be in exactly the same position as they (a peculiar stance, 
since they would then not enjoy the good luck of having wealth.) If δ  < 1, so 
future descendants get less weight than the current generation, it would seem 
that families would consume some but not all of their wealth, and if δ is large 
enough, wealth and consumption per capita would diminish over time.  This 
would still be true if r were somewhat in excess of n.  What enables consumption 
per capita to be constant overall is that at the same time, there are some poor 
and low wage families who have “struck it rich,” enjoying either higher wages 
than their parents or well-above average returns to capital.  In these families, 
there is an increase in consumption per capita.    
We can solve for the optimal savings as a function of the wealth of the individual 
(a function of the known stochastic processes and preferences28) and wages:  
s(W,w; r(t), 𝛽𝛽, δ) where at any moment, the individual’s wealth is the outcome of 
the wage and capital stochastic processes.  Savings is a function of the future 
course of interest rates; in steady state, matters simplify:  there is just a single 
variable, r*.   In discrete time, W = w + k.  In continuous time, k is a stock and w is 
both a flow (wage payments per unit time) and a state variable (that determines 
future flows), so we don’t add them together.   The wealth stochastic process is 
modified to   
(19)  𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑 = (𝑠𝑠(𝑊𝑊,𝑤𝑤; 𝑟𝑟 ∗)(𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑 − 𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑 ) − 𝑛𝑛)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + dwt 
where the evolution of w is governed by the stochastic process 
                                                          
28 We explicitly note only δ, but obviously, the elasticity of marginal utility also matters. 
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(20)    𝑑𝑑 ln  𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑 = −𝛽𝛽(ln𝑤𝑤 − ln  𝑤𝑤�)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎 ln𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑 
The pair of coupled stochastic differential equations (one for k, the other for w, the 
two together defining W) gives rise to the equilibrium wealth distribution in which 
some rich families are in the process of decumulating wealth, and some are saving.  
On average, the very rich are decumulating, leaving less to their heirs, eating into 
their inherited capital, but spreading out their wealth over future generations.  
Those in the middle may be saving, knowing that there may be a rainy day, and 
they want to anticipate the bad fortunes that may occur in the future.  Macro-micro 
consistency entails all the accumulations and decumulations just offset each other, 
and the postulated r* is the rate of return on capital, given the equilibrium capital 
labor ratio.  A higher equilibrium r that might have been associated with an ever 
decreasing consumption in a representative agent model is not in this model simply 
because of the heterogeneity of the population and the shocks to which they are 
exposed.   
The savings rate itself is endogenous, the result of families, in each position, i.e. in 
any particular {w,W}, knowing the (stochastic) evolution of the states of their 
children, maximizing family wealth.    
Capital taxation 
It becomes more difficult in this context to determine what will happen to the 
average savings rate, and therefore to the (before and after tax) interest rate, as a 
result of an increase in the capital tax, which in a partial equilibrium setting lowers 
the return to capital.  Plausibly, if families have strong feelings of intergenerational 
equity, to guarantee that future generations have as high a standard living as the 
current will require a higher savings rate.  If that happens, the before tax interest 
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rate could fall, implying an even greater decease in the after tax interest rate.  
Alternatively, the savings rate could decrease:  parents’ sense of equity towards 
future generations is not so strong that when the trade-off between current and 
future generations changes, so does there sense of what they want to leave their 
children.  The lower savings rate drives up the before tax interest rate.  The limiting 
case (discussed above) is one where the before tax interest rate is driven up so 
much that the after tax interest rate remains unchanged.   
The important point is that these are behavioral responses, not responses that 
should be assumed on the basis of some hypothetical intertemporal dynastic 
maximization model. And it would be wrong to infer the aggregate responses by 
assuming a representative agent in the absence of uncertainty.  The uncertain 
evolution of future generations’ well being is an essential part of the savings 
decision. The wide range of estimates of interest elasticity of savings for individuals 
in different circumstances suggests caution in prediction.  The failure of the 
aggregate savings rate to increase in response to large changes in the tax rate—in 
the US, the savings rate went down as the tax rate went up—suggests that 
institutional factors (like individuals current mortgage commitments, savings plans 
for which they are signed up at work) may drive savings behavior in the short run—
and it is the short run behavior which is relevant for standard macro-economic 
analysis.29  But we are interested here in the long run; and in the long run, 
adjustments do occur which reflect underlying beliefs and preferences.  But those 
beliefs and preferences are themselves endogenous.30  For instance, in countries 
                                                          
29 Accordingly, these institutional factors may differ markedly across countries.  Some may be more conducive to 
macro-stability than others. 
30 Recent strands of research in behavioral economics have stressed the endogeneity of preferences.  See, e.g. Hoff 
and Stiglitz (2016). 
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where there is a high level of youth unemployment, children are increasingly living 
with their parents until some time in their thirties.  It is conceivable that bonds 
across generations are strengthened, especially as compared to those in a country 
where it is more common for children to leave home earlier and live at some 
distance from parents.  Changes in intertemporal preferences—a weakening of 
bonds across generation—would result in more inequality in consumption but less 
inequality in wealth, provided the elasticity of substitution is not too small or the 
savings rate does not decrease too much.31  In the remainder of the paper, we shall 
assume preferences are fixed. 
I.E. Using the model to explain changes in inequality 
The previous discussion highlighted the robust conditions under which the 
economy converges to an equilibrium wealth (and wage) distribution.  We can 
ask, what changes in (a) the process of intergenerational transmission of 
advantage; (b) in markets; and (c) in public policy have occurred which affect the 
asymptotic distribution?   
Intergenerational transmission of advantage 
If the very rich can use their wealth, and more broadly the position in society that 
that wealth gives to them, to get higher returns to their capital and access to 
better jobs for their children (“rents” in the labor market, above normal returns in 
the capital market), then wealth will become more concentrated.  This has, of 
course, always been true—connections matter, and connections are passed on 
                                                          
31 Using equation (18), we observe that the variance of k will be reduced so long as sr does not increase too much.  
Let s* be the average savings rate.  Then it is straightforward that s* = nk/f, s*r = n rk/f = share of capital in 
national income.  If s* is reduced, k is reduced.  If the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1, that means s*r is 
increased, increasing the variance of k. But if the elasticity of substitution is much smaller than 1 and the savings 
rate decreases a lot, then s*r could increase significantly, outweighing the direct effect of the increase in s.   
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across generations; but if the extent to which this is true changes, then there will 
be a change in the equilibrium distribution of income and wealth.   
One might have thought that in a meritocratic society these connections would 
matter less, and that may indeed be the case in countries, like those in 
Scandinavia, which take meritocracy seriously.  But in countries like the US, there 
is little evidence that the importance of connections has significantly decreased.  
Indeed, ironically, in an imperfect meritocracy, the importance of connections 
may actually be increased.  For instance, increasingly to get a good job one needs 
an internship, which is often unpaid.  Not only can the children of the less affluent 
not afford these internships, but it often takes connections to even get this 
unpaid work.32   
The use of connections to get access to jobs becomes more important when jobs 
are rationed, i.e. there is unemployment.  If macro-economic policies are run in a 
way that results in persistently higher unemployment, one might expect 
inequality to increase, not only as a result of the direct impacts on wages, but the 
indirect impacts we have just identified through the intergenerational 
transmission of advantage. 
Connections and/or wealth matter in another sphere:  politics.  In many countries, 
those with connections are able to extract rents from the public, a subject to 
which we turn in Part II.33   This is true even in democracies, though it has to be 
                                                          
32 Perlin (2011). 
33 As we note in Part II, much of inequality in many countries is related to privatizations and the sale of public 
assets at below market prices. India’s spectrum auction is one of the most recent examples.  But there are many 
others.  Sometimes the transfers occur in a more indirect way:  the government issues a banking license to 
someone that is politically connected; the “private” bank lends money to favored parties to purchase the state 
assets that are being privatized.  Restrictions on who can bid ensure that the prices are below what they would be 
in a competitive market.  Much of the Russian oligarchy was created in this way.  
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done in a more “rule based” way:  the manner in which the banks first 
“purchased” deregulation, and then received mega-bailouts, is a case in point.34 
How wealth begets wealth—and how those in poverty become trapped there—is 
well understood.  Those near bankruptcy have to pay higher interest rates, 
making their descent towards the bottom even steeper.35   Their attempts at 
survival occupy so much of their energies that they cannot think about the long 
term; and accordingly, they do not make the long term investments that would 
increase their incomes.36 
Tail inequality in a world with near zero interest rates 
In an era in which interest rates are near zero—and even the return to many risky 
assets is very low—how can the inequality of income and wealth increase? Our 
model predicts wealth convergence and low inequality.  Our usual models 
differentiate between “labor” and “capital” and, with the “savings glut,” it would 
seem that the return to capital should have plummeted.37  Shouldn’t that mean 
that the share of capital would have plummeted too38, and so too income and 
wealth inequality?  In Piketty’s analysis, this period of low (even negative in real 
terms) interest rates should be an era of wealth convergence, with r < < n.  But 
instead, there is wealth divergence.  The reason that the predicted wealth 
convergence has not occurred are instructive. 
                                                          
   To the extent that connections can be purchased, this just reinforces the increasing (private) returns associated 
with wealth ownership.   
34 See Johnson, Simon and Kwak (2010) or Stiglitz (2010). 
35 Battiston et al. (2012) refer to this as trend reinforcement.   
36 Mani et al. (2013); Mullainathan and Shafir (2009).  
37 Bernanke (2005). 
38 Under the assumption of an elasticity of substitution less than unity.  See Part I of this paper for a discussion of 
the elasticity of substitution.   
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Preferential access to credit 
Those without wealth cannot get access to credit markets. 39  This becomes 
especially important in an era of super low interest rates, where the profits from a 
project if there is access to credit can be very high.  Thus, as we have already 
noted, those at the top do not hold bonds but equities, and QE has increased the 
return on equities.  (In Part II, we explore other reasons for the increase in return 
on certain equities, related to the growth of market power.) 
Knowledge and inequality 
With the high level of unemployment globally, the scarce factor in our economy 
would seem not to be labor.  With negative real returns, the scarce factor in our 
economy would seem not to be capital.  What is “scarce” is knowledge.  Capital 
flows relatively freely across borders; yet differences in per capita income persist, 
and largely because of impediments to the free flow of knowledge40.  The banks’ 
manipulation of the LIBOR and foreign exchange markets as well as insider trading 
scandals exemplify the returns that can be obtained from information 
asymmetries41—even information asymmetries deliberately created by the 
market.  While these were outside the law, there are pervasive opportunities to 
do similar things (with perhaps slightly lower returns) within the law.  It is the 
belief that there are returns to knowledge that motivates those who manage 
capital to invest so much in the acquisition of knowledge, and to work so hard to 
                                                          
39 Similar results hold in nutrition based efficiency wage models.  The very poor have such poor health that there is 
no wage at which they will be hired.   
40 There are, of course, other factors, including important differences in institutions.   
41 It should be noted that only the most egregious examples of the use of inside information are illegal and get 
prosecuted.   
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keep what they know secret.42  But not everyone has equal access to knowledge; 
those at the top, with more wealth, have better access to information; and in 
markets timing is critical:  knowing something slightly before others can yield 
large (private) returns.43  We expand on the implications of this in the next 
section. 
Risk taking 
Given the asymmetries of information—those without access to special 
information know that the equity markets can be a stacked game—and given that 
less well-off individuals are more risk averse44, it is natural that the richest 
individuals own a disproportionate share of equities; and if equities have a higher 
return than safer assets, then, on average, those at the top will see their wealth 
grow on average faster than those lower down.  Moreover, as wealth increases, 
individual’s ability to absorb risk increases.  This means that as society gets 
wealthier, the dispersion of returns may increase—leading to fatter tail wealth 
distributions at the top.  (This effect could be partially offset by improvements in 
the management of risk, so that the overall portfolio risk—which is what matters 
for the evolution of wealth inequality—is reduced.  But these improvements 
would in turn lead to a still further increase in overall risk taking.  The 
                                                          
42 As it is sometimes put, “knowledge” is both power and money.  For a broader discussion, see Greenwald and 
Stiglitz, 2014. 
       Interestingly, the efficient markets hypothesis suggested such investments yielded no return:  information 
disseminated perfectly and instantaneously throughout the economy.  But why then would rational individuals 
invest so much money in gathering information?  See Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).  The evidence, however, is that 
markets are not informationally efficient, and that means there are returns to investment in 
information/knowledge. See Shiller (2002).   
43 Especially if other market participants are overconfident or unaware of their informational disadvantage.  Note 
again these are private returns, not social returns.  See Stiglitz (1975,1982b) and Hirschleifer (1971).  Differential 
access to technology and information processing abilities has similarly given rise to rents in equity markets, 
especially more recently, in high frequency trading.  See Stiglitz (2014b) and the references cited there.   
44 It is a standard assumption that there is decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
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presumption is that the net amount of risk taking would still increase with 
wealth.)   
Further, if better information enables one to select assets with higher means 
relative to their risk, then rich individuals will be able to construct higher return 
portfolios for any given risk level, and more willing to undertake greater risk.  
There is moreover natural returns to scale, because the acquisition of information 
is a fixed cost.  (The problem arises from the inability to credibly sell information.  
Portfolio managers could, in principle, avail themselves of the same advantage 
and market it to ordinary customers.  The fact of the matter is that they cannot.  
Ordinary individuals cannot screen between fund managers that have been lucky 
and those that have been skilled, and portfolio managers know this.) 
Education as a mechanism for the transmission of advantage 
Earlier, we explained how, if richer individuals (high wage individuals) invest more 
in the human capital of their children, so their children have higher wages, the 
pace of regression towards mean will be slowed and there will be more wealth 
inequality.   
High quality public education can counter this force, ensuring that everyone faces 
a more level playing field. If the educational system did this, it would be the most 
important centripetal force for equality in our society. 
But in a society, like the US, where there is a reliance on local funding for schools, 
if there is more economic segregation,45  then there will be more inequality in the 
transmission of human capital.  So too if greater reliance is placed on tuition for 
                                                          
45 Evidence is that economic segregation has increased. See Bischoff and Reardon (2011). 
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financing tertiary education, in the absence of adequate scholarships; and this is 
even true if debt financing is made available, unless the debt repayments are 
income contingent, as in Australia.  Higher interest rates charged on student loans 
will lead to more inequality of human capital; so too would the passage of a 
bankruptcy law that makes student debt not-dischargeable even in bankruptcy (as 
the US has done with a series of laws dating to the 1970s, the most recent 
expansion of which was the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005). 
Changes in markets46 
Changes in markets may also lead to changes in the equilibrium wealth 
distribution.  Better insurance and annuity markets mean that individuals have to 
accumulate less precautionary and retirement savings.  There is large variability in 
the time of death, and those who die early with large amounts of precautionary 
and retirement savings leave more to their children.47  Better rental markets or 
reverse mortgages mean that the elderly are less likely to hold large amounts of 
wealth as they grow older—passing on less to their heirs upon death.48  An 
increase in the difference between life expectancy and the age of retirement49 
and an increase in the variance of the age of death will lead to more wealth 
inequality.  Public social insurance programs (Medicare and social security) mean 
                                                          
46 We focus in this section on changes in markets other than the widely discussed changes directly affecting wage 
inequality, such as skill biased technological change, globalization, etc.   
47 These are sometimes referred to as "unplanned bequests," but that is not quite an accurate description:  
individuals take this risk into account in their savings decisions. For early discussions of equilibrium wealth 
distributions arising from such bequests, see Stiglitz (1978) and Flemming (1979).  
48 It is worth noting that there are large differences across countries in the relative role of rental markets vs. home 
ownership.  In Germany, homeownership is relatively low.   
49 In the absence of annuity markets, individuals care not just about the mean life expectancy; the variability in life 
expectancy will also affect savings rates—and therefore the importance of life cycle savings. 
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that individuals would have to hold less wealth against the risk that they live a 
long time, and hence imply less inequality in inherited wealth.  At the same time, 
the diminution in life cycle savings means that the observed inequality in wealth 
may increase.  What most economists would say really matters, inequality in 
consumption, is, however, decreased by these programs.50    
Stiglitz (1978) constructs a simple model of stochastic death which gives rise to a 
Pareto tail, which is consistent with the above observations.  He notes that since 
capital taxation increases the amount that individuals have to save for their 
retirement, it can lead to higher levels of average bequests and wealth inequality.  
With strong public social security programs, with the tax exemption of most life-
cycle savings, and with defined benefit retirement programs, this effect is 
probably not significant for those in the bottom half of the distribution; but with 
the weakening of public programs and a shift from defined benefit to defined 
contribution retirement programs, this effect could become more significant for 
those with upper-middle incomes in the future. 
General equilibrium effects and multiplicity of equilibrium 
Early developments in growth theory noted that if there is a difference in 
consumption patterns of the rich and the poor, with the rich preferring capital 
intensive goods, multiple equilibria could easily arise:  There is one equilibrium 
with a high return to capital and low wages where capital intensive goods are 
                                                          
50 Still, inequalities in wealth may be of concern in its own right for several reasons.  In a world with incomplete 
and inadequate social and private insurance, and imperfect capital markets, individuals have to fall back on their 
savings when a calamity happens.  When there is no wealth to draw upon, there can be long term effects.  The 
well-intentioned limits on the ability to use social security as collateral has an unintended effect of making 




predominately produced and consumed, and another one with a low return to 
capital and high wages where labor intensive goods are predominately 
produced.51 
Analogous effects arise in the models under study here.  Assume that the rich 
prefer commodities the production of which is associated with more risk.  But as 
we saw earlier, the rich have a greater tolerance for risk and own 
disproportionately risky investments.  There is an equilibrium in which the rich get 
a larger share of the economic pie, so that the structure of production is more 
risky, generating for them higher returns.  Because the variance of returns will be 
higher, there will be more inequality in the distribution of wealth. 
Figure 2 illustrates the basic notion, with the average return to capital on the 
vertical axis and a measure of inequality on the horizontal axis, the share of 
national income going to “capitalists”.  As the return to capital increases 
(including payments for risk bearing) the share of capitalists’ income increases.  
But as the share of capitalists increase, the relative demand for risky assets 
increases, and so does the price of risky assets.  Thus, there are two upward 






                                                          




Multiple Equilibria:  Demand Creates its Own Supply 
The vertical axis is the average return to capital; on the horizontal axis is a measure of inequality (such as the share 
of income going to “capitalists”).  More inequality results in a greater relative demand for risky assets and hence a 
higher average return on capital.  A higher average return on capital results in greater inequality.  There can be 
multiple equilibria—a “conservative” equilibrium with low level of inequality, a low fraction of assets that are risky, 
a low risk premium, and a low share of capital; and a “risky” equilibrium where just the opposite is true. 
 
But the rich can themselves move the economy towards the high risk-high return 
to capital equilibrium.  Assume that they control the choice of technology within 
the firm.  Reflecting their greater ability to bear risk, they choose a riskier 
technology, inducing (on average) more risk in corporate shares.  The market 
equilibrium will entail a higher “price” for risk, higher average incomes therefore 
of those at the top who, on average, are more able and willing to bear risk.   
“Innovations” like structured finance can similarly give rise to a shift in average 
income towards the top and an increase in wealth inequality.  It increases the 
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supply of safe assets, and increases the risk associated with the residual.  The 
former reduces the returns to the assets held by ordinary individuals (the life 
cycle savers) and increases those held by dynastic savers.52 
Structural Transformation 
The economy is going through a structural transformation, from a manufacturing 
economy to a service sector based economy.  The transformation itself can have 
large distributive effects.  Some individuals are better able to make the 
transformation, to seize the new opportunities.  They will do well.  Others will be 
left behind.  The result is that there can be an increase in inequality—an 
explanation similar to one originally posed for the Kuznets curve in earlier stages 
of development.   
But the level of inequality in the new equilibrium may differ as well.  For instance, 
Greenwald has argued that because the size of the production unit in services is 
smaller, it may be easier to identify the individual contribution of any particular 
individuals (as opposed to in the assembly line, where it is virtually impossible.)  
When it is possible to easily observe differences in productivity, market wages will 
do so.   
Moreover, if there are smaller production units, within firm interactions in wage 
setting become less important:  individuals worry about equity, and even janitors 
in higher paying enterprises get paid more.  Vertical disintegration will result in 
                                                          
52 Of course, if the generalized Modigliani-Miller theorem held (Stiglitz ,1974a) held, structured finance would not 
alter the general equilibrium.  Stiglitz explains why the conditions required for the MM theorem to hold are not 
likely to be satisfied. 
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janitorial services being provided by separate firms, with wages relatively 
unaffected by compensation of others within the supply chain.53   
Unionization will often prove more difficult in this new context; unions have 
traditionally pushed for wage compression.   
Finally, it is even possible that the range of observed productivity differences in 
certain areas of services is greater than in the arena of manufacturing.  The 
assembly line provides a constraint on what any individual worker can do.   
In short, the distribution of equilibrium wages (and therefore wealth) may differ 
as production technologies change.  In primitive agriculture, holding land quality 
constant, the main difference in productivity may have been related to physical 
strength.  As agriculture developed, differences may arise as a result of the ability 
to process weather and other information, to know the right time to plant, the 
right kinds of fertilizer to use.  As agriculture develops still further, and these 
knowledge functions are routinized, differences in productivity may actually be 
reduced.   
Globalization too has contribution to an increase in inequality.  Globalization is 
partly the result of changes in technology—lower costs of transportation and 
communication.  But it is also a result of changes in policy, described below:  one 
could have structured globalization in ways which would have resulted in less 
inequality.  Globalization in particular has reinforced one aspect of today’s 
economy which has increased the centripetal forces at play:  the “winner take all 
economy,” an economy where fixed costs are more important and as a result of 
                                                          
53 We discuss this further in Part II. 
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Bertrand competition, the firm with the lowest costs wins the entire market.  
(Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2014.)   
More generally, as we noted earlier, differences in productivity are related to 
differences in knowledge, but who appropriates the returns is in fact at least 
partly a matter of public policy.   
Changes in public policy 
Public policy can have, both directly and indirectly, a major impact on each aspect 
of the generation of wealth inequality described above.  Here, I note eight points.  
First, in our discussion of annuities, we observed that the provision of public 
annuities reduces the need for individuals to save for retirement.  But since most 
countries only provide limited public annuities, there are differential effects 
across the income distribution:  It partially accounts for the essentially zero 
savings for retirement for the bottom part of the population.  Hence, overall, 
wealth inequality (as it is traditionally measured, excluding implicit social security 
wealth) is increased.54 
Secondly, taxation of capital and especially bequests has both an income and a 
substitution effect reducing bequests, and thus the transmission of inequality.  
Accordingly, the lowering of the tax on capital and bequests would be expected to 
lead to an increase in wealth inequality.  Thus, the marked lowering since 1980 in 
                                                          




these taxes almost surely has played a significant role in the increase in wealth 
and income inequality.55  
Progressive capital taxes reduce wealth inequality, as we have seen.  Changes in 
taxation in the United States have reduced progressivity.  Indeed, today those 
with very high incomes pay much lower effective tax rates on their income than 
those with lower incomes.  In the models explored here, this can in fact give rise 
to an ever increasing level of wealth inequality.   
Thirdly, monetary policy, whether intentionally or not, affects the distribution of 
income and wealth.  Quantitative easing increased the wealth of the wealthy 
individuals who own the bulk of equities.  Low interest rates encourage firms to 
use more capital-intensive technologies, reducing the demand especially for low 
skilled workers.  If monetary authorities tighten whenever wages start to rise, the 
effect will be a ratcheting down of the wage share.56   
Traditionally, the central distributional conflict confronting monetary authorities 
has been seen as that between debtors and creditors, with low interest rates 
benefiting the former at the expense of the latter.  But today, the conflict is often 
between owners of equity and owners of short term debt.  The impact on wealth 
distribution may be driven by differences in portfolios. 
                                                          
55 There are two important caveats to this conclusion, in at least some of the models we have examined.  In, for 
instance, the Kaldorian model, there is full shifting; thus, the lowering of the tax rate simply leads, in equilibrium, 
to a lowering of the before tax return—with the after tax return unaffected.  In general, though, the general 
equilibrium effects, both in the short run and the long, depend on the extent to which the proceeds of the taxes 
are invested, and the effectiveness of government in making such investments. Moreover, one hundred percent 
inheritance taxation results in an increase in consumption inequality.  See Stiglitz, 1976a, 1976b.   
56 See chapter 10 of Stiglitz (2012a) and Stiglitz (2015a) for a more extensive discussion of the distributional effects 
of monetary policy.   
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Public policy affects the relative returns to different classes of assets and the 
riskiness of these assets; and in doing so affects the ownership distribution of the 
assets.  Preferential treatment of capital gains taxes is of most value to the rich, 
and hence this tax policy not only benefits the rich, but also may lead to greater 
disparity in ownership patterns.  Limitations on loss offsets may be less binding on 
high wealth investors, and hence these provisions may similarly have asymmetric 
effects.   
Fourth, we note that any change in markets or public policy which affects the 
distribution of wages will (according to our basic model) affect over time the 
distribution of wealth.  There is an extensive recent literature on the 
determinants of wage dispersion, discussing, for instance, how globalization and 
skill biased technological change may have led to greater wage inequality.  But 
the extent to which this is true is not just determined by market forces, but how 
those market forces are shaped by public policy, e.g. the rules governing 
unionization and globalization.  
Fifth, we note that changes in policy affect not just the distribution of wages 
among workers, but also the distribution of factor incomes between workers and 
capitalists.  For instance, asymmetric trade liberalization (where capital market 
and goods market liberalization precede labor market liberalization) exacerbates 
downward wage pressures in advanced countries.  (Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005.)  
Going forward, changes in the economy and in globalization, including the rules 
governing it, may affect inequality for another reason that we noted briefly 
above:  the increasing share of services (Greenwald and Kahn, 2009) may increase 
the importance of local monopolies.  (See Part II.) 
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Sixth, again, there are important general equilibrium effects.  A policy like capital 
market liberalization exposes a country to more risk, thus increasing the demand 
for “risk absorption services.”  It is the wealthy that disproportionately provide 
those services.  The returns to risk-absorption increase, i.e. the income of the 
wealthy, better able to manage risk, increases.  Thus, a change in policy that 
increases risk increases the Pareto tail and increases the share of national income 
going to the rich.   
Seventh, markets don’t exist in a vacuum.  They have to be structured, by laws 
and regulation.  How they are structured affects market income and after-tax and 
transfer income.  And the two cannot be separated.  The tax system obviously 
affects behavior in ways which affect market income.  Stiglitz et al (2015) argue 
that it is changes in these rules in the US and elsewhere that accounts for much of 
the change in inequality. 
Finally, if we endogenize the political equilibrium, we can again get multiple 













Endogenous Political Equilibria 
There may be multiple equilibria.  On horizontal axis we have a measure of inequality.  On the vertical axis we have 
a measure of liberalization (or any other inequality increasing policy, such as the degree of regressivity of the tax 
system).  With more inequality, the political equilibrium entails policies resulting in greater risk and a higher risk 
premium.  But a higher risk premium is associated with more inequality. 
 
 
Again, on the horizontal axis we have a measure of inequality.  On the vertical axis 
we have a measure of liberalization (or any other inequality increasing policy, 
such as the degree of regressivity of the tax system).  More unequal societies 
support more liberalization; they are better able to handle the resulting risk. We 
do not have to formalize precisely the political system.  We only have to make the 
reasonable assumptions that (a) political power is unequally distributed, with (i) 
the rich having disproportionate power and (ii) an increase in the income of the 
rich relative to the rest increases their power, so that in a polity with more 
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political power, outcomes reflect more the preferences of the rich.  Thus, a 
transfer of wealth from the poor and middle class to the rich has two effects.  At 
any given distribution of political power, the rich “demand” more liberalization, 
since they are less risk averse (making the usual assumption that risk aversion 
declines with wealth).  Secondly, the outcome will be more reflective of their 
preferences.  Of course, the lower and middle classes should become more 
opposed to liberalization, since they are less able to handle risk.  Figure 3 assumes 
that the disproportionate power of the rich is sufficiently disproportionate that 
the preferences of the rich dominate.  This may be particularly plausible if the rich 
are able to persuade the rest that there will not be an increase in risk, and that 
the change will increase the incomes of all, either directly or through some 
version of trickle-down economics.   
In particular, if part of the process by which these political outcomes are obtained 
entails the expenditure of money (lobbying), with the poor and middle class 
having lower wealth, the question is what happens to their marginal utility of 
income (wealth) relative to the marginal cost of extra liberalization.  While the 
liberalization benefits for the rich are increased and the marginal lobbying costs 
are reduced, the liberalization costs for the rest are increased and the marginal 
lobbying costs are increased.  Thus, it is plausible (though not necessarily the 
case) that the rich increase their lobbying efforts more than the rest, reinforcing 
the conclusion that the outcome will more likely reflect their increased 
preference for lobbying.57  But in more liberalized societies, there is more 
                                                          
57 Indeed, if risk aversion remains relatively constant at lower levels of income, and diminishes only once one hits 
very high income levels, then the cost of extra liberalization does not increase for the poor and middle with an 
increase in inequality (a lowering of their income), while the benefit for the top does.  If the policy variable under 
discussion is say the tax rate at the top, then greater inequality increases the benefit of the rich to lowering the tax 
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volatility, and that volatility increases the income of the rich disproportionately, 
as it increases the risk premium, which goes disproportionately to the rich; there 
is more inequality.  Again, there can be multiple equilibria.   
Cyclical effects 
The models of this paper are concerned with the long run evolution of the wealth 
distribution.  Yet, one cannot separate the consequences of economic instability 
from the long run analysis, particularly in the presence of asymmetries and 
hysteresis effects.  It is those at the bottom that suffer the most from economic 
fluctuations (see, e.g. Furman and Stiglitz, 1998), and in the boom, they do not 
make up for what they lose in the recession (especially if monetary authorities 
follow the kinds of policies described earlier)58.  Instability may thus contribute to 
income and wealth inequality—the recent economic downturn being a case in 
point.59 The extent to which this is so depends, of course, on both the strength 
and design of automatic stabilizers, like unemployment insurance, but also the 
strength and design of discretionary policies.  Policies, such as undertaken in the 
US in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, which bailed out banks but did little to help 
                                                          
rate and lowers the cost of lobbying.  But it also increase the benefit of the poor of increasing the marginal tax rate 
(the revenue raised through a marginal increase in the top tax rate is increased), though again it raises the 
marginal cost.  I am indebted to Joan Esteban for discussions on these matters.  The logic and analytics here are 
similar to that of Hoff and Stiglitz (2004).  Programs of disempowerment and disenfranchisement of the poor and 
working are intended to weaken their influence in the political process, and thus make the outcome more 
reflective of the interests of those at the top.  See Stiglitz (2012a). 
58 See Stiglitz, 2010. 
59 It should be pointed out, however, that these effects are not unambiguous, since many economic fluctuations 
are associated with stock market crashes that especially adversely affect those at the top.  Income and wealth 
inequality fell after the stock market crash of 1929.  The 2008 crisis may have especially adversely affected workers 
because of the disproportionate effect on housing wealth, and government policies which seem to have restored 
stock market wealth more effectively than housing wealth.   
44 
 
homeowners, contributed to the increase of inequality generated by that 
recession.60 
The workerless economy:  the limiting case 
The role of the rules of the game, that is politics, in determining the equilibrium 
can be illustrated by an analysis of the workerless economy, the limiting case of 
what is of increasing concern, the replacement of workers by robots.  Any 
technological advance (including advances in the organization of society, e.g. 
associated with globalization) is supposed to move the utility possibilities curve 
outwards, increasing the maximum level of utility for one individual (class of 









                                                          
60 In addition, there are a range of interactions between growth, stability, and inequality, affecting all of the 




Figures 4a and b 







Thus, in principle, all individuals could be made better off.  A problem arises if the 
competitive equilibrium (without government intervention, or more precisely, 
without an accommodating change in government policy in the new equilibrium) 
is such that some individuals are worse off.  This might be the case with, for 
instance, Hicksian labor saving innovations, the limiting case of which is the 
workerless economy, in which the competitive equilibrium wage would be zero.   
But if this is truly a welfare enhancing innovation, then there must be some 
change in policy (e.g. a lump sum redistribution, or a change in the progressivity 
of the tax system, or a change in intellectual property rights) which ensures that 
all individuals are better off.  If that is not the case, then the new utility 
possibilities schedule (after the innovation) incorporating the feasible set of 
government policy measures, including redistributive actions) crosses the old (see 
Figure 4b above).  The innovation is not unambiguously welfare increasing.  It 
makes sense for those hurt by the new technology to seek to prevent its use.   
An overview of the changing balance between centrifugal and centripetal forces 
in the economy 
Three of the key centripetal forces in the economy may have weakened in recent 
decades, especially in the United States:  the tendency for smaller families has 
weakened the effects of division among heirs;  the reduction of progressivity of 
the tax system—to the point where at the upper reaches it has become 
regressive—may have changed the stochastic process describing returns from one 
characterized by mean reversion to one characterized by trend reinforcement; 
and the equalizing effect of public education has been weakened with increased 
economic segregation and increasing disparities between schools attended by the 
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children of the rich and that of the poor.  Meanwhile, some of the centrifugal 
forces may have become stronger—wage disparities have increased, with 
stagnation, or even decreases, in real wages of those at the bottom and soaring 
increases at the top; the structural transformation from manufacturing to a 
service sector economy may have contributed to this.  So too for skill biased 
technological change.  Disparities in household incomes may have increased even 
more than disparities in individual income, with an increasing divide between 
families with two high income earners and at most one child, and those with one 
breadwinner, often working at low wage jobs.  Increases in assortive mating 
(which itself can be explained) have lead both to more inequality at the moment 
and to a weakening of a key centripetal force.  Differentials in access to health 
care between the top and the bottom are one factor contributing to large 
observed differences in health status, reinforcing earnings differentials.   
Given all of this, it is not surprising that there has been increased disparity in the 
income and wealth distribution.  But all of this may not fully account for the 
growth in inequality, especially at the top of the wealth distribution, but even 
elsewhere.  As we suggested at the beginning, the basic model leaves out rents, 





Rents and the Growth in Inequality 
Part I of the paper outlined a set of hypotheses attempting to explain the increase 
in inequality, focusing on changes which would move the economy from one 
equilibrium wealth distribution to another, more dispersed distribution.   Many of 
those changes are associated with an increase in the share of capital.  The 
increased share of capital is, in turn, consistent with an elasticity of substitution 
less than unity and a decrease in the capital labor (capital output) ratio.  The latter 
in turn is consistent with some national income accounting data for many 
advanced countries.  For instance in the US, national savings data would easily 
suggest a decrease in the capital effective labor ratio (capital output ratio).61   
At the last World Congress of the International Economic Association, I suggested 
that the way to reconcile this observation with Piketty’s data on an increase in 
wealth income ratios was an increase in rents, including monopoly rents.  Since 
then, numerous others have confirmed the importance of a variety of forms of 
rents for a variety of countries62. 
I want to focus on four observations: 
a)  Much of the income of those at the top is capital gains, an increase in the 
value of existing assets.   
b) Much of the increase in wealth has been an increase in particular of land 
values. 
                                                          
61 See Stiglitz (2015b, Part I, and 2016c). 
62 Weeden and Grusky (2013).  
49 
 
c) There has been an increase in market concentration in many industries 
throughout the economy.63 
d) Increases in inter-firm disparities in wages (of individuals of seemingly 
similar qualifications) account for more of the increase in wage inequality 
than increases in intra-firm disparities.64   
Increased market power 
If an increase in market concentration leads to more market power, then that 
leads to greater monopoly rents, and the capitalized value of that leads to 
more wealth.  The increase in wealth will go to the residual claimants at the 
time the increased market power is recognized.  As we have seen, it is those at 
the very top that own equities, i.e. that gain from the (greater than 
expected)65 increased market power. 
There are several reasons—beyond decreased effective enforcement of anti-
trust laws—that changes in the structure of the economy over the past third of 
a century may have naturally been associated with an increase in market 
power.  (a)   an increase in the importance of sectors with large network 
externalities, in which naturally there will be one or a few dominant platforms; 
(b) an increase in the importance of sectors with high fixed costs and low 
marginal costs (much of the digital and knowledge economy), where again 
there is a tendency for there to be dominant firms66; (c) an increase in 
                                                          
63 Council of Economic Advisers, 2016; Furman and Orszag (forthcoming) and the references cited there. 
64 Song et al and Furman and Orszag and the references cited there. 
65 In informational efficient markets, an expectation of an increase in market power sometime in the future would 
be fully capitalized at the moment that it occurred.  But Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) explain why markets 
will never be fully informational efficient.  Shiller’s work confirms their theoretical prediction. 
66 See Stiglitz and Greenwald (2014). In such markets, there is often a dominant firm—a winner take all market.   
Schumpeter thought that competition for the market was an effective substitute for competition in the market 
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knowledge about how to create, maintain, and extend market power, 
including the design of contracts that help preclude entry67.  Along with 
learning about how to make goods more efficiently has come learning about 
how to create entry barriers; (d) strengthening of intellectual property rights 
has enhanced the market power of those who do make advances in 
knowledge68; and (e) one of the implications of the move from manufacturing 
to the service sector economy is an increase in (the average degree of) market 
power, since services are provided locally, and competition within each locale 
for the provision of these services may be limited. 
Increased rents leads to decreased capital accumulation 
Note that the increases in market power leading to an increase in wealth 
(relative to income) that we have just described may actually lead to a 
decrease in capital accumulation.  The economy suffers on two accounts—the 
inefficiencies associated with the increase in market power and decreased 
capital accumulation.   
This is seen most simply in a simple model where individual savings are a 
function of individual’s income, in the Haig-Simons definition, including capital 
gains.  We thus have 
                                                          
(what later came to be called the contestability doctrine).  This has, however, shown not to hold with any 
generality.  See, e.g. Farrell (1986) and Stiglitz (1988). 
67 These contracts have played an important role in many industries which have been called “two-sided,” including 
credit cards and airline reservation systems.  In fact, these markets are often not characterized by the externalities 
that are central to two-sided markets.  A recent court ruling in the US in a suit against Sabre by US Airways, 
following a jury finding, held that Sabre’s contract terms were anti-competitive (US Airways, Inc., vs. Sabre 
Holdings Corp., et al., 11 Civ. 2725 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York). See 
Reuters, Dec 20, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-american-airline-sabre-idUSKBN1492K4. 
68 Henry and Stiglitz (2010), among others, argue that there has been a significant strengthening of intellectual 
property rights in recent decades. 
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  (21)       I + ΔE = s(Y + ΔE) 
where I is investment, ΔE is the change in equity value as a result of the 
(anticipated) increase in market power, Y is national income in the national 
accounting sense (wage income, return to capital, and profits) and s is the 
savings rate (for the moment assumed fixed.)  Thus 
  (22)       I = sY – (1 – s) ΔE, 
so that if macro-policy keeps the economy at any given level of output 
(hopefully full employment)  an increase in ΔE decreases investment.  Those 
wishing to hold more wealth, do so in the form of an increased value of 
existing assets (ownership claims against existing corporations) rather than the 
creation of new assets.69   
Increased rents as explaining the paradoxes of modern growth 
In Stiglitz (2015b), I set forth a set of seeming paradoxes, aspects of modern 
growth that are hard to reconcile with standard theory.  For instance, if capital 
and wealth were the same, then the observed increase in the wealth income 
ratio should have led to a decreased share of capital, given the wealth of 
studies suggesting an aggregate elasticity of substitution less than unity; and it 
should have led to increased wages.  But if the productive capital decreased 
(as predicted by the above model and confirmed by national accounts data for 
the US and some other advanced countries for which we have the data), then 
the paradox is resolved.  Similarly, (average) wages should have gone up, if the 
                                                          
69 Ignacio Gonzales has emphasized in his work that this translates into an increase in the value of Tobin’s q.  In this 
case, an increase in q is associated with a decrease in investment, unlike the standard story where an increase in q 
motivates an increase in investment.   
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capital stock had gone up, unless there was a marked increase in the returns to 
capital.  But if capital stock decreased (relative to GDP), then a decrease in 
average wages is less of a surprise.   
Perhaps the greatest paradox is this:  not only do real wages on average seem 
to be stagnating, at least in the US, the return to capital seems to be low, with 
a riskless rate that is negative in real terms.  Yet investment (as a share of GDP) 
remains low.  This could, of course, be because of massive macro-economic 
problems, a major misalignment of factor prices.  But there has been no 
tectonic shift in technology that would warrant a massive change in 
equilibrium factor prices that could account for such macro-economic 
imbalances.  The factor-price frontier, the dual to the production function, 
implies that with technological change, the real wage corresponding to any 
given real interest rate (return on capital) should increase; but while the real 
interest rate has not increased (indeed, it seems to have decreased), neither 
has the real wage.  One cannot account for this within a competitive 
framework; this paradox can be resolved simply:  an increase in market 
power.70    
Increased Dispersion in Productivity and Wages Across Firms 
As we have noted, it has been widely observed71 that there are large wage 
differences across firms.  Some have suggested that changes in these across 
firm wage differences may be more important in explaining changes in wage 
inequalities than wage differences within firms, i.e. between executives and 
                                                          
70 The standard neoclassical analysis ignores risk, but it is straightforward to incorporate risk into this analysis.   
71 See Mortensen (2005) for a review of the literature on this.  
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workers.  The latter has been the focus of those who see weaknesses in 
corporate governance as contributing to inequality.  The former suggests 
something else is going on.  Why are there persistent differences in 
productivities across firms?  And if there are, why would high 
productivity/profit companies pay workers of a given skill more?  Why would 
they seemingly share some of their profits with their workers?72   
Explaining persistent productivity/profitability differences 
There are two explanations for the existence of (persistent) 
productivity/profitability differences across firms.  One relates to the slow 
diffusion of knowledge, emphasized by Stiglitz and Greenwald (2014).  
Knowledge does not disseminate quickly across society.  There are large and 
persistent differences.  Some firms specialize in moving the frontier forward.  
Others let information diffuse to them.  Because knowledge is costly to 
produce and acquire, it will be optimal for firms not to spend the resources to 
“catch up” (Stiglitz, 2015c).  If the pace of innovation increases or the costs of 
innovation relative to the cost of imitation increases, then there will be greater 
productivity dispersion.  It seems plausible that this has occurred, at least in 
some sectors. 
The second explanation is an increase in market power.  If an industry comes 
to be dominated by one or a couple of firms, those firms will have higher 
                                                          
72 One answer is that the analyses have not fully adjusted for worker quality.  There are unobservable 
characteristics, which, try as one might, are impossible to fully correct for.  The more profitable firms are also 
better at identifying these hard to observe characteristics; there are enough of these firms that workers can 
appropriate some of the returns from their hard-to-observe characteristics.  We do not explore this explanation 




profitability—the higher prices these firms receive for the goods relative to the 
cost of production will show up as higher productivity.  But it is not that these 
firms are producing more “widgets per man hour,” just that they use their 
market power to extract more from consumers for each widget sold.  It is an 
improvement, as it were, in “marketing” rather than in “production,” as we 
conventionally think of it.  Earlier in this section, we provided several reasons 
why on average we might observe an increase in market concentration. 
Decreasing share of labor  
An increase in differential and monopoly rents can help explain a declining 
share of labor—a decrease in the wage relative to average productivity.  So too 
could a weakening of workers’ bargaining power, a result of (a) an increase in 
the average unemployment rate, itself a consequence of changed macro-
economic policies, in particular, monetary policies focusing on inflation; (b) a 
change in labor legislation weakening unionization and changing the structure 
of collective bargaining; and (c) globalization—increasing the threat of firms to 
outsource and relocate.73  Moreover, changes in corporate governance and 
norms can enable senior management in a company to increase the share of 
corporate revenues going to senior management—and decrease both 
investment in the future of the company and workers’ compensation.  Indeed, 
there is evidence of an enormous decrease in the share of the bottom 99% of 
workers, excluding effectively bankers, CEOs, and other senior management 
from around 75% of GDP to 60%. 
                                                          
73 Reinforced, for instance, be investment agreements which increase property rights protections of firms.  Even 
without this, globalization/trade liberalization would predictably lead to an increase in wage inequality within 
advanced countries, as a result of the factor price equalization theorem.  See Stiglitz (2006). 
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Figure 5 presents Olivier Giovannoni’s calculations showing a decline from 
around 75% of GDP to 60%. 
Figure 5   






Rent Sharing  
The analysis so far explains why compensation has not kept pace with 
productivity, implying the marked change in the share of labor.  But there has also 
been an increase in the dispersion of labor income, some of which can be 
explained by some of the factors already discussed—in particular, skilled biased 
technological change, globalization, and weaknesses in corporate governance.  
The question remains, why are wages in more profitable firms higher?  Why are 
firms with more market power seemingly sharing their profits with their 
workers—something that would not occur in a perfectly competitive market?   
Efficiency wage theory provides one possible explanation.  In more productive 
firms (e.g. the more innovative firms studied by Aghion et al 2017) it may be 
harder to measure any individual’s contribution.  Hence, it is more important to 
provide a strong incentive not to shirk (interpreting that in the broadest sense, 
including exerting due effort at the duties that have been assigned).  If, moreover, 
there are higher turnover costs (workers are not replaceable parts in an assembly 
line, e.g. it is expensive to create a research team and to replace any member 
who has departed) then firms will pay higher wages to induce workers not to 
leave (e.g. for a firm with more attractive non-pecuniary attributes.)74   
There is a related reason that many such firms, especially those relying on 
intellectual property rights or engaged in borderline nefarious practices (an 
umbrella that brings within its ambit a large fraction of highly profitable firms).  
Even with non-compete clauses, information about what is going on inside the 
                                                          
74 See Stiglitz (1974b, 1985), Arnott and Stiglitz (1985). 
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firm can leak out, and such information can be deleterious to the long term well-
being of the firm.   
More broadly, morale is important in all firms, but it may be especially important 
in those firms attempting to strive to maintain a competitive edge over their 
rivals, and especially so in the more dynamic sectors of the economy.  Morale is 
affected by perceptions of fairness (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990)75, and that can be 
affected by relative wages—relative to profits and relative to that received by 
senior management.  Thus, at the margin, it will pay highly profitable firms to pay 
higher wages.   
On the other hand, if a firm is heading towards bankruptcy, the value of lower 
turnover or better morale is much lower.  These firms thus pay lower wages both 
because they cannot “afford” to pay higher wages, but also because it is not 
optimal for them to do so.  The fact that they can retain labor while paying lower 
wages is as much testimony to labor market imperfections as the fact that 
profitable firms seem to be paying more than necessary.76 
These arguments are reinforced by managerial theories of the firm (theories in 
which managers have considerable discretion77).  Life is easier for managers if 
                                                          
75 In my original working paper on efficiency wages, Institute of Development Studies, Nairobi, 1969, I laid out four 
explanations, going beyond nutrition:  labor turnover, morale, incentives, and selection. 
76 It also reinforces the view that there may be measurement problems.  A firm contemplating hiring a low paid 
worker that (on the basis of observable data) seems underpaid would naturally suspect that there is some hidden 
characteristic.  A firm making such an offer knows that it will suffer from a winner’s curse problem:  it will only 
succeed in recruiting the worker when the wage offered exceeds his productivity; otherwise, the existing firm will 
match the offer. In short, the adverse selection (lemons) problems are intrinsic in labor markets—all previously 
employed workers are “used” workers.  See Greenwald (1979, 1985), Stiglitz (1982a), Nalebuff, Rodriguez, and 
Stiglitz, 1993, and Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1985a.  Thus, labor market imperfections—immobility of labor—is an 
intrinsic consequence of information asymmetries of the adverse selection form.   
77 Older formulations of these theories (Berle and Means (1991)) were based on institutional analysis.  More recent 
developments, including those of Simon (1992), March and Simon (1958) and Stiglitz (1985b) derived managerial 
delegation from theories of imperfect information.   
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workers are happier and well-motivated. Some of the costs of keeping workers 
happy—and the life of the manager easier—are borne by executives. 78 
In short, in an economy marked by more monopoly power, firms will have higher 
profits, and some of those profits will be shared by workers—not just the top 
management, but throughout the firm.  Workers lucky enough to work at those 
firms will wind up better off; and even more so for the executives in those firms.  
Because of costly search and information based imperfections in labor markets, 
those in low paying firms can’t easily move to higher paying firms.  Wage 
differentials may persist.  (Stiglitz, 1985a.)   
Vertical disintegration 
Management, aware of these effects, may act to limit the extent of rent sharing, 
by engaging in vertical disintegration.  Workers may be more sensitive to their pay 
relative to others in the same firm than to others in different firms.  This may be 
partially because they may ascribe some of the differences to unobservable 
variables that represent a fair basis of differentiation:  the firm may be in a more 
difficult financial position, or the working conditions may be poorer or promotion 
possibilities weaker.   
There is an old theory of the boundaries of firms, based on Coase’s work on 
transactions costs (Coase, 1937).  But our analysis provides another theory:  
creating distance through vertical disintegration between workers in different 
parts of the value-creation chain allows greater opportunities for wage 
                                                          
78 Of course, firms may establish countervailing incentives, e.g. paying firms on the basis of profits (though that is 




differentiation, and for a larger fraction of the value added to be seized by 
“upstream” parts of the production process, design, innovation, and the overall 
management of the production process. 79   
Increased land rents 
A significant fraction of the increase in wealth is associated with real estate, which 
consists of the value of land plus the value of structures.  In equilibrium, the value 
of structures will be closely linked to the costs of construction.  While it is labor 
and resource intensive, and therefore those costs would be expected to increase 
in tandem with labor and resource prices, there has also been significant 
technological advances.  Almost surely, most of the increase in real estate value 
(beyond the increase in structures themselves) is accounted for by an increase in 
land values.   
Because the value of land today is largely dependent on the expected value 
tomorrow, there is a large potential for a land bubble; and not surprising, there 
frequently have been such bubbles. As we noted earlier, the magnitude of capital 
gains affects the size of capital accumulation.  In simple models, one can show 
that the {price, capital accumulation} dynamics are a saddle point; if, for any given 
value of K, the price of land is set incorrectly, the economy cannot converge to 
the steady state.  (Stiglitz, 2015b.)  The economy sets down an unsustainable 
“bubble path” requiring eventually unsustainable increases in land prices. 
Eventually it is discovered that the economy is not on its equilibrium path, and 
the price of land will be reset.  But when it is reset, there is no assurance that it 
                                                          
79 Stiglitz and Greenwald (2014) provide still another theory:  that information moves more freely within a firm, 
and the optimal size of the firm balances these benefits with the diseconomies of scale and scope.   
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will be set at precisely the value required to converge to the long run equilibrium.  
Of course, if the economy consisted of a single individual, with infinite foresight 
and full rational expectations, then today, prices would be set correctly.  That, 
implicitly, is the assumption in standard macro-economics.  But those 
assumptions are inappropriate, and it is clear that the economy does not act as if 
they were true.   
Typically, along bubble paths, there will be growing wealth inequality, since those 
owning the real estate are disproportionately wealthy.  Of course, if the economy 
were really in equilibrium and there were no risk, this would matter little, because 
those holding other assets would get the same return.  But this is not true if 
holding land is viewed to be riskier (one of the reasons that—beyond their 
ownership for their own housing—that the wealthy own a disproportionately 
large share).   
While it is easy for an uncoordinated market economy to thus diverge along a 
bubble path, government (regulators) may recognize that this is so before the 
market does.  It can restrain the growth of a bubble.  On the other hand, it can 
also contribute to the growth of a bubble—and the growth of inequality.   
The growth of land bubbles is fed by the growth of credit, and the growth of 
credit in most capitalist economies has been delegated to the private sector, 
subject to certain regulations.  Restricted entry plus natural barriers to entry 
provide this sector considerable rents, and even more so if the government 
stands ready to pick up losses.  Under these conditions, if the government allows 
excessive credit creation, it can facilitate the creation of a land bubble, a 
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seemingly self-fulfilling prophecy in the short run, even if it is not sustainable in 
the long run.   
Thus assume that the amount of credit made available (here, for land purchases) 
is an increasing function of the value of land (used as collateral), P, subject to 
certain regulatory constraints, r: 
    (23)                    C = M (P, r) 
But the demand for land is based on the availability of C and the expected return 
to land.   For simplicity, we normalize the land supply at unity.  Thus 
   (24)           P = min {C + G(W(P)), D(dln P/dt + FT)} 
where G represents individuals’ other sources of funds for buying land, which we 
express simply as a function of wealth W, itself a function of the price of land.  FT 
are land rents, and D(dln P/dt + FT) represents the demand for land (expressed as 
dollar holdings), a function of the total return, the expected capital gain and the 
land rent.  The supply of land (in value terms, i.e. dollars) is equal to the effective 
demand, and that is equal to the minimum of what individuals want to buy and 
what they can buy.  If the credit constraint is binding, the above two equations 
generates a price path of land that is a function of changes in regulatory 
constraints and wealth.  If these are loosening and/or are expected to loosen at a 
sufficiently fast pace, then the credit constraint today may well be binding. Thus, 
the land bubble can be said to be generated by the process of deregulation itself.  
In the US and elsewhere, that process allowed a major expansion of credit on the 
basis of a limited increase in bank capital.   
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Matters are even worse if banks allocate capital in a discriminatory way, and 
there is considerable evidence that they do so, at least in the US.  Because credit 
markets may well be characterized by credit rationing, those who get credit enjoy 
a surplus that similarly situated individuals or firms who are denied credit do not 
get.80   
Increased political rents (including IPR) 
The term rent seeking originated in a political context:  domestic industries sought 
protection from foreign competition through tariffs and quotas.  These trade 
interventions increased firm profits—but it seemed better to refer to these profits 
simply as “rents” that they received as a result of the protection.  It paid firms to 
lobby:  the higher the tariffs, the more the rents.   
Recent literature has expanded the use of the term rents, to embrace virtually any 
return not related to “effort.” 81  Rent seeking entails seeking a larger fraction of a 
given economic pie, as opposed to returns from increasing the size of the economic 
pie.   
Such rents take on many forms—from direct gifts (agricultural subsidies) and tax 
benefits (e.g. associated with preferential treatment of capital gains or depletion 
allowances for natural resources), to paying more than market prices for some 
goods (the prohibition of US government from negotiating competitive prices for 
                                                          
80  It is apparent from standard theories of credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) that those who get access to 
credit enjoy a surplus. 
  One aspect of the corruption that marked the US financial system was that in some cases, the bankers worked to 
recapture some of this surplus for themselves.  Tracing out the mechanisms by which they did this would take us 
beyond the scope of this paper.  See Stiglitz (2003). 
81 Though admittedly, tariffs and quotas arise from lobbying efforts, there is an obvious distinction between these 
“efforts” and productive efforts.   
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drugs) to selling assets (like natural resources) at below competitive prices.  Many 
rents are hidden (e.g. in the tax code or through the provision of insurance at below 
market prices, or in banks’ access to funds at low interest rates from the Federal 
Reserve) or arise from protection from competition afforded through regulation.  
Some rents are an inevitable byproduct of even good regulation, e.g. those that 
arise from zoning or the construction of public transport; but even then the 
government could capture much or all of the rents through appropriate taxation or 
auctions.     
Earlier, we described the multiple economic/political equilibrium that can arise—
public policy can be set as to lead to more inequality, and more inequality leads to 
such public policies.  One key set of policies are those that give rise to rents.  Since 
the wealthy are better able to lobby for such rents and are more likely to own the 
corporations which successfully do so, this rent seeking is typically inequality 
increasing.  Thus, in a country like the US where money has a large role in politics, 
it is not a surprise to see a large amount of rent seeking and rents play such a large 
role in the economy. 
Again, there may be multiple equilibria:  high levels of economic inequality result 
in high levels of political inequality, which result in pro-inequality economic and 
political systems, and pro-inequality economic and political systems result in higher 
levels of inequality.  A country like the US can be trapped in the bad equilibrium.  
Others have been fortunate to be in a good equilibrium. 
General Equilibrium effects 
Such multiple equilibria are especially likely to arise once we take into account 
general equilibrium effects.  Assume, for instance, that some effort is required to 
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achieve a lower tax rate—expenditures which are themselves not tax deductible.  
Assume a tax benefit b for an industry could be achieved through the expenditure 
of e, b(e), with b’ > 0.  Assume too that the industry acts cooperatively in setting 
that effort to maximize industry after tax profits (where π gives the maximized 
value of profits at any level of benefits b) 
(25)           Π = (1-τ)π (b(e)) – e, 
yielding 
 (26) 
(1- τ) π’b’ = 1. 
The solution is denoted by b*.  The equilibrium level of benefits b* is a function of 
τ.  Under plausible restrictions on the profit and benefit (as a function of effort), 
b* is a decreasing function of τ, i.e. b* = b*( τ), with b*’ < 0.  It pays to put less 
effort into getting benefits when the tax rate is higher.   
Rents can be defined as the difference between what profits would have been at 
b= 0 and at b*.   
  (27)      R = Π(b*(τ)) – Π (0)= R(τ) 
 with R’ < 0.  (The social costs typically exceed R, i.e. the rents are worse than pure 
transfers.)  It follows that the higher the tax rate, the lower the rents. 
Now imagine an economy with many similarly situated industries, and that they 
now collectively can lobby for the level of corporate income tax τ.  The strength of 
their lobbying effort is related to the marginal benefit that they get out of a lower 
tax rate.  The expected corporate income tax rate with a corporate lobbying effort 
of E is τ(E),  τ’ < 0, τ” > 0 .  If each industry takes its level of benefits as given, and 
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the corporate sector then cooperates to maximize its net income, (1 – τ) Π(b*) – 
E, optimal lobbying is given by  
 (28)            -τ’(E) Π* = -τ’(E)[R + Π (0)]  = 1, 
so 
 (29)          d ln E/dln R =R / ξ( R + Π (0)) > 0 
where ξ  = - dln  τ’ / dln E >  0.  Thus, 
(30)       d ln τ / dn R = (d ln τ / dn E)( d ln E / dn R) = - η d ln E/dln R  
                                       =  - η R / ξ( R + Π (0)) < 0 
where η = - dln τ/ dln E >  0.  The lower the rents, the higher the equilibrium 
corporate income tax rate. 
The equilibrium is the simultaneous solution to (27) and (28).  Once again, there 
can be multiple equilibria.  And once again, the economy can be trapped in a bad 
equilibrium, with low (corporate) tax rates inducing high levels of rent seeking 
(equation 26);  and high levels of rents inducing high levels of effort at lowering 









Endogenous Political Equibria II 
Higher tax rates lead to less lobbying for rents in each industry, and therefore lower rents.  Higher rents 
lead to more lobbying for lower tax rates, and therefore lower tax rates.  There can be multiple 




This paper has explored a variety of mechanisms by which inequality is created.  
Over the last third of a century, we have seen a marked increase in inequality.  
The question is why.  We have suggested that it is useful to look at the issue of 
the dynamics of inequality through equilibrium analysis, seeing the current 
increase as a shift from one equilibrium to another.  It may be, of course, that the 
“equilibrium” to which the economy is converging is one in which all income goes 
to capital, or in which all income goes to the very richest family.  And there are 
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limiting cases of the models analyzed here where that may be the case.82  It is 
perhaps more likely though that there are equilibrating mechanisms.  Schumpeter 
talked about creative destruction, in which one monopoly gets replaced by 
another.83  So too, there are equilibrating mechanisms, described in this paper, in 
which, with high probability, the wealth of a dynasty eventually weakens, at least 
in a relative sense. 
The benchmark model on which we focused in Part I assumed competitive 
markets.  We analyzed equilibrium as a balancing of centripetal and centrifugal 
forces, and described how recent changes in markets and policies had upset an 
old equilibrium, leading to a new one with greater inequality.  This model was 
able to explain some aspects of the shape of the wealth and income distribution, 
though much further work is needed in exploring the richness of the interactions 
between wage and wealth inequality and the intergenerational transmission of 
advantage and disadvantage.   
Still, we suggested that some, perhaps much, of the increase in inequality in 
recent decades may not be explicable within the confines of that model:  one has 
to introduce rents, and an analysis of the origins and persistence of rents.  the 
fact that the capitalized value of rents accounts for much—in some countries 
more than a 100%—of the increase in wealth (at least relative to income) 
suggests that more attention should be given to this analysis of rents.   
                                                          
82 Elsewhere, I have analyzed models of endogenously determined factor biased technological change in which 
there are unstable dynamics resulting in the share of capital going to unity if the elasticity of substitution is greater 
than unity. See Stiglitz (2014a). 
83 Though as we noted, these forces may be far weaker than Schumpeter assumed.   
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We have explained why many of the changes in the structure of the economy in 
recent decades might naturally have led to an increase in market power, and 
shown how some of the standard models of labor markets with imperfect 
information and contracting result in some of the resulting monopoly rents be 
shared with labor, but shared inequitably.  Competition within the labor market is 
sufficiently weak as to prevent the resulting “labor rents” from being competed 
away.   
Monopoly rents are only one source of rents—land rents, intellectual property 
rents, and rents extracted from the public have almost all surely played a role in 
the increase in inequality in the US and other advanced countries.   
An underlying current in the models explored here is the role of policy and public 
action.  While there are economic forces at play which may be moving the 
economy towards an equilibrium with more inequality, there are changes in 
policies which could countervail these forces.  Too often, changes in policy may, 
instead, have reinforced them.   
One needs to see the policies themselves as part of the equilibrium.  Policies are 
endogenous.  There may be multiple political-economic equilibria—the economy 
can be caught in an equilibrium in which there is a high level of economic 
inequality, leading to politics which support economic rules which support the 
high level of economic inequality; but there is a “better” equilibrium in which 
there is a low level of inequality, and the politics supports policies which are 
consistent with this more egalitarian society.  We have not explored how one 
could move from the bad equilibrium to the good equilibrium.   
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Implicit in our analysis is the belief that perhaps, in those societies like the US 
caught in an inequalitarian equilibrium, if members of society had a better 
understanding of what is occurring, they might take actions within the given 
political rules of the game, to move the economy towards economic rules that 
might succeed in moving society towards the good equilibrium. 
We have attempted to use these “benchmark models” to provide some insights 
into the marked increase in inequality in so many societies around the world.  
There are several general conclusions worth noting:  There are multiple factors 
contributing to the growth of inequality; any attempt to reduce it significantly will 
accordingly have to be multi-faceted.  Simplistic solutions often heard in political 
discourse, such as increasing education, while necessary, will not suffice.  It will 
take major actions, significant changes to the economic system, including 
diminishing the role of rents and reducing the forces for intergenerational 
transmission of advantage and disadvantage.  Because, as we have argued in Part 
II, so much of the growth of inequality is associated with rents, policies aimed at 
reducing those rents and appropriating more of the rents for public purpose and 
redistribution (e.g. through taxation) will simultaneously increase growth and 
efficiency and reduce inequality. 
When I began my research into the dynamics of income inequality a half century 
ago, I did so because I thought the level of inequality I observed then seemed 
intolerable.  As a young economist, I wanted to understand the forces that gave 
rise to it, in the hope that by understanding those forces, we might do something 
about it.  I had not realized then that I was living in the golden age of capitalism—
that inequality was at the lowest level ever in modern times.  We are still far from 
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understanding fully the forces that give rise to inequality.  For decades, the field 
was left untilled, and in the intervening years, inequality has grown far worse.  
The work of Piketty, Atkinson, Saez and others have given us a far firmer empirical 
basis for understanding inequality.  There remains the theoretical challenge of 
making sense of all of this.  I hope that this lecture may be a small contribution in 
helping us move forward on this important task. 
References 
Aitchison, J.  and J.A.C.  Brown, 1966. “The Lognormal Distribution with special reference to its uses in 
econometrics,” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (first edition, 1957). 
Akerlof, G. and J. Yellen, 1990. “The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment,” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 105(2): 255-83. 
Arnott, R., and J. E. Stiglitz, 1985. “Labor Turnover, Wage Structure & Moral Hazard: The Inefficiency 
of Competitive Markets,” Journal of Labor Economics, 3(4): 434-462. 
Battiston, S., D. Delli Gatti, M. Gallegati, B. Greenwald, and J.E. Stiglitz, 2012. “Liaisons dangereuses: 
Increasing connectivity, risk sharing, and systemic risk.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control, 36(8): 1121-1141.  
Becker, G. S. and N. Tomes, 1979. "An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of Income and 
Intergenerational Mobility," Journal of Political Economy, 87(6): 1153-1189. 
—— 1986. "Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of Families," Journal of Labor Economics, 4(3)  . 
—— 1994. "Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of Families," in Human Capital: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education (3rd Edition), Gary S. Becker (ed.), 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Berle, A.A. Jr and G. C. Means, 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: 
Macmillan 
Bernanke, B. S., 2005. “The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit,” The Sandridge 
Lecture, Virginia Association of Economists, Richmond, VA. 
Bevan, D. L., 1974. "Savings, inheritance and economic growth in the presence of Earnings Inequality," 
Oxford University mimeo.    
—— 1979, "Inheritance and the Distribution of Wealth," Economica, 46(184): 381-402. 
Bevan, D. and J.E. Stiglitz, 1979. “Intergenerational Transfers and Inequality,” The Greek Economic 
Review, 1(1): 8-26. 
Bischoff, K. and S. F. Reardon, 2011. “Income Inequality and Income Segregation,” American Journal of 
Sociology, 116(4): 1092-1153. 
Champernowne, D. G., 1953. "A Model of Income Distribution," Economic Journal, 63(250): 318-351.   
71 
 
Coase, R., 1937. “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, 4(16): 386-405.  
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), 2016. “Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market 
Power,”  https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160414_cea_competitio
n_issue_brief.pdf. 
Farrell, J., 1986. “How effective is potential competition?” Economic Letters, 20: 67-70. 
Flemming, J. S., 1979. "The effects of earnings inequality, imperfect capital markets, and dynastic 
altruism on the distribution of wealth in life cycle models,"  Economica, 46(184): 363-380.   
Furman, J. and P. Orszag, (forthcoming). “A Firm-Level Perspective on the Role of Rents in the Rise in 
Inequality,” in Economic Theory and Public Policies: Joseph Stiglitz and the Teaching of 
Economics, M. Guzman (ed.), New York: Columbia University Press. 
Furman, J. and J. E. Stiglitz, 1998. “Economic Consequences of Income Inequality,” in Symposium 
Proceedings – Income Inequality: Issues and Policy Options, Jackson Hole, WY: Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City, pp. 221-263. 
Giovannoni, O.G., 2014. "What do we know about the labor share and the profit share? - Part III: 
Measures and Structural Factors," Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper no. 
805. 
—— 2015. "Inequality:  Challenge of the Century?" Presentation to the ASSA meetings, Boston, January 
3.   
Greenwald, B., 1979. Adverse Selection in the Labor Market, New York: Garland Press.  
—— 1986. "Adverse Selection in the Labor Market," Review of Economic Studies, 53(3): 325-347.   
Greenwald, B. and  J. Kahn, 2009. “Globalization: n. the irrational fear that someone in China will take 
your job,” Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons. 
Grossman, S. and J. E. Stiglitz, 1976. “Information and Competitive Price Systems,” American Economic 
Review, 66(2): 246-253 
—— 1980. “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets,”  American Economic Review, 
70(3): 393-408. 
Hirshleifer, J., 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," 
American Economic Review, 61(4): 561-574. 
Henry, C. and J. E. Stiglitz, 2010. “Intellecutal Property, Dissemination of Innovation, and Sustainable 
Development,” Global Policy, 1(1): 237-251. 
Hoff, K. and J. E. Stiglitz, 2004. “After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in 
Post-Communist Societies,” American Economic Review, 94(3): 753-763. 
—— 2016. “Striving for Balance in Economics: Towards a Theory of the Social Determination of 
Behavior,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 126(PB): 25–57. 
Johnson, S. and J. Kwak, 2010. 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown, 
New York: Pantheon. 
Kaldor, N., 1957. “A Model of Economic Growth,” The Economic Journal, 67(268): 591-624. 




Lipsey, R. G. and Lancaster, K., 1956. "The General Theory of Second Best," Review of Economic 
Studies, 24(1): 11-32. 
Mani, A., S. Mullainathan, E. Shafir, and J. Zhao, 2013. “Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function,” Science, 
341(6149): 976-980. 
March, J. G. and H. A. Simon, 1958. Organizations, New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
L. Mattauch, D. Klenert, O. Edenhofer, and J. E. Stiglitz, 2017. “Piketty Meets Pasinetti: On Public 
Investment and Intelligent Machinery,” January. 
Mortensen, D., 2005. Wage Dispersion: Why are Similar Workers Paid Differently?, Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Mullainathan, S. and E. Shafir, 2009. “Savings Policy and Decision-making in Low-Income Households,” in 
Insufficient Funds: Savings, Assets, Credit, and Banking among Low-Income Households, Rebecca 
M. Blank and Michael S. Barr (eds.), New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 121-146. 
Nalebuff B., A. Rodriguez, and J. E. Stiglitz, 1993. “Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Screening 
Device,” NBER Working Paper 4357, May. 
Nalebuff B. and J. E. Stiglitz, 1985. “Unemployment As a Worker Selection Device,” Princeton University, 
(Revision of “Quality and Prices,” Princeton University Econometric Research Memorandum No. 
297, May 1982). 
Newbery, D. and J. E. Stiglitz, 1984. “Pareto Inferior Trade,” Review of Economic Studies, 51(1): 1-12. 
Oxfam, 2017. “An economy for the 99%,” Oxfam Briefing Paper, January. 
Pasinetti, L., 1962. “The Rate of Profit and Income Distribution in Relation to the Rate of Economic 
Growth,” Review of Economic Studies, 29(4): 267-279. 
Perlin, R., 2011. Intern Nation, London: Verso. 
Piketty, T., 2014. Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press. 
Rodriguez, A. and J. E. Stiglitz, 1991. “Equilibrium Unemployment, Testing, and the Pure Theory of 
Selection,” presented at NBER/CEPR Conference on Unemployment and Wage Determination, 
Boston, October. 
Samuelson, P. A., and F. Modigliani, 1966. “The Pasinetti Paradox in Neoclassical and More General 
Models,” Review of Economic Studies, 33(4): 269-301. 
Shiller, R., 2002. Irrational Exuberance, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Simon H. A., 1991. "Organizations and Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(2): 25-44. 
Solow, Robert M., 1961. “Note on Uzawa's Two-Sector Model of Economic Growth,” Review of Economic 
Studies, 29(1): 48-50. 
 
Song, J., , D. Price, F. Guvenen, N. Bloom, and T. von Wachter, 2016. “Firming up inequality,” Stanford 
University mimeo 
Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1966. "The Distribution of Income and Wealth Among Individuals,” Presented at the 
December 1966 meetings of the Econometric Society, San Francisco, December 29 (MIT mimeo). 




—— 1969. “Distribution of Income and Wealth Among Individuals,” Econometrica, 37(3): 382-397.  
—— 1974a. “On the Irrelevance of Corporate Financial Policy,” American Economic Review, 64(6): 851- 
 866. 
—— 1974b. “Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment in L.D.C.’s: The Labor 
Turnover Model,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88(2): 194-227.  
—— 1975. “The Theory of Screening, Education and the Distribution of Income,” American Economic 
Review, 65(3): 283-300. Reprinted in Selected Works of Joseph E. Stiglitz, Volume I: Information 
and Economic Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 99-121. 
—— 1976a. “Notes on Estate Taxes, Redistribution, and the Concept of Balanced Growth Path 
Incidence,” Journal of Political Economy, 86(2), part 2: 137-150. 
—— 1976b, “Estate Taxes, Growth and Redistribution,” in Essays in Honor of W. Vickrey, R. Grieson 
(ed.), Lexington: Lexington Publishing Company, pp. 225-232. 
—— 1978. “Equality, Taxation and Inheritance,” in Personal Income Distribution, W. Krelle and A.F. 
Shorrocks (eds.), North-Holland Publishing Company, pp. 271-303. (Proceedings of IEA 
Conference, Noordwijk aan Zee, Netherlands, April 1977.) 
—— 1982a. “Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment: The Efficiency Wage 
Model,” in The Theory and Experience of Economic Development: Essays in Honor of Sir Arthur 
W. Lewis, M. Gersovitz et al. (eds.), London: George Allen & Unwin, pp. 78-106. 
—— 1982b. “Information and Capital Markets,” in Financial Economics: Essays in Honor of Paul Cootner, 
William F. Sharpe and Cathryn Cootner (eds.), Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, pp. 118-158. 
Also NBER Working Paper 678. Reprinted in The Selected Works of Joseph E. Stiglitz, Volume II: 
Information and Economic Analysis: Applications to Capital, Labor, and Product Markets, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 55-84. 
—— 1985a. “Equilibrium Wage Distributions,” Economic Journal, 95(379): 595-618. 
—— 1985b. "Credit Markets and the Control of Capital," Journal of Money, Banking, and Credit, 17(2):  
 133-152. 
—— 1988. “Technological Change, Sunk Costs and Competition,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
pp. 883-947. 
—— 2003. The Roaring Nineties: A New History of the World’s Most Prosperous Decade, New York:  
 W.W. Norton & Company. 
—— 2006. “Samuelson and the Factor Bias of Technological Change,” in Samuelsonian Economics and 
the Twenty-First Century, M. Szenberg et al (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 235-
251. 
—— 2010. Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy, New York: WW 
Norton. 




—— 2012b. “Macroeconomic Fluctuations, Inequality, and Human Development,” Journal of Human 
Development and Capabilities, 13(1): 31-58. Reprinted in Macroeconomics and Human 
Development, Deepak Nayyar (ed.), London: Taylor and Francis, 2013. 
—— 2014a. “Unemployment and Innovation,” NBER Working Paper 20670, November. 
—— 2014b. “Tapping the Brakes: Are Less Active Markets Safer and Better for the Economy?” Presented 
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2014 Financial Markets Conference Tuning Financial 
Regulation for Stability and Efficiency, April 15. Available 
at http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/news/conferences/14fmc/Stiglitz.pdf.   
—— 2015a. “Fed Policy, Inequality, and Equality of Opportunity,” keynote address to the Ninth                   
 Biennial Federal Reserve System Community Development Research Conference, Washington, 
DC, April 3. 
—— 2015b. “New Theoretical Perspectives on the Distribution of Income and Wealth Among 
 Individuals: Parts I-IV,” NBER Working Papers 21189-21192, May. 
—— 2015c. “Leaders and Followers: Perspectives on the Nordic Model and the Economics of  
 Innovation,” Journal of Public Economics, 127(C): 3–16. 
—— 2015d. “The Origins of Inequality, and Policies to Contain It,” National Tax Journa,l 68(2): 425-448. 
—— 2016a. “New Theoretical Perspectives on the Distribution of Income and Wealth among 
Individuals,” in Inequality and Growth: Patterns and Policy, Volume I: Concepts and Analysis, 
Kaushik Basu and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), IEA Conference 156(I), Houndmills, UK and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
—— 2016b. Towards a General Theory of Deep Downturns, IEA Conference 155(VI), Houndmills, UK and 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. NBER Working Paper 21444, August 2015. Originally 
presented as Presidential Address to the 17th World Congress of the International Economic 
Congress, Dead Sea, Jordan, June 2014. 
—— 2016c. “The Measurement of Wealth: Recessions, Sustainability and Inequality,” in Contemporary 
Issues in Macroeconomics: Lessons from The Crisis and Beyond, Joseph E. Stiglitz and Martin 
Guzman (eds.), IEA Conference 155(II), Houndmills, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. NBER 
Working Paper 21327, July 2015. Paper presented at a special session of the International 
Economic Association World Congress, Dead Sea, Jordan, June 2014 sponsored by the OECD. 
—— and A. Charlton, 2005. Fair Trade for All, New York: Oxford University Press. 
—— and B. Greenwald, 2014. Creating a Learning Society: A New Approach to Growth, Development, 
and Social Progress, New York: Columbia University Press. Reader’s Edition published 2015. 
—— with N. Abernathy, A. Hersh, S. Holmberg and M. Konczal, 2015 Rewriting the Rules of the American 
Economy, A Roosevelt Institute Book, New York: W.W. Norton. Available 
at http://www.rewritetherules.org. 
—— and H. Uzawa, 1970. Readings in the Theory of Economic Growth. New York: Cambridge University  
 Press. 
—— and A. Weiss 1981, “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,” American Economic  
 Review, 71(3): 393-410. 
75 
 
Uzawa, H., 1961. "On a Two-Sector Model of Economic Growth, I," Review of Economic Studies, 29: 40-7. 
—— 1963. "On a Two-Sector Model of Economic Growth, II," Review of Economic Studies, (30): 105-18. 
Weeden, K.A. and Grusky, D., 2014. “Inequality and Market Failure,” American Behavioral Scientist,  
 58(3): 473-491. 
 
 
 
 
